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Insider threat has continued to be one of the most difficult cybersecurity threat vectors
detectable by contemporary technologies. Most organizations apply standard technologybased practices to detect unusual network activity. While there have been significant
advances in intrusion detection systems (IDS) as well as security incident and event
management solutions (SIEM), these technologies fail to take into consideration the
human aspects of personality and emotion in computer use and network activity, since
insider threats are human-initiated. External influencers impact how an end-user interacts
with both colleagues and organizational resources. Taking into consideration external
influencers, such as personality, changes in organizational polices and structure, along
with unusual technical activity analysis, would be an improvement over contemporary
detection tools used for identifying at-risk employees. This would allow upper
management or other organizational units to intervene before a malicious cybersecurity
insider threat event occurs, or mitigate it quickly, once initiated.
The main goal of this research study was to design, develop, and validate a proof-ofconcept prototype for a malicious cybersecurity insider threat alerting system that will
assist in the rapid detection and prediction of human-centric precursors to malicious
cybersecurity insider threat activity. Disgruntled employees or end-users wishing to cause
harm to the organization may do so by abusing the trust given to them in their access to
available network and organizational resources. Reports on malicious insider threat
actions indicated that insider threat attacks make up roughly 23% of all cybercrime
incidents, resulting in $2.9 trillion in employee fraud losses globally. The damage and
negative impact that insider threats cause was reported to be higher than that of outsider
or other types of cybercrime incidents. Consequently, this study utilized weighted
indicators to measure and correlate simulated user activity to possible precursors to
malicious cybersecurity insider threat attacks. This study consisted of a mixed method
approach utilizing an expert panel, developmental research, and quantitative data analysis
using the developed tool on simulated data set. To assure validity and reliability of the
indicators, a panel of subject matter experts (SMEs) reviewed the indicators and indicator
categorizations that were collected from prior literature following the Delphi technique.
The SMEs’ responses were incorporated into the development of a proof-of-concept
prototype. Once the proof-of-concept prototype was completed and fully tested, an
empirical simulation research study was conducted utilizing simulated user activity
within a 16-month time frame. The results of the empirical simulation study were
analyzed and presented. Recommendations resulting from the study also be provided.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background
As society relies increasingly on information systems (IS), the threat of malicious
insider activity continues to be of paramount concern in both the public and private
sectors (Glasser & Lindauer, 2013). Recognizing insider threats has presented one of the
most complex challenges in the information security field with even the definition of
“insider threat” proving difficult (Costa et al., 2014). Due to the nature of the insider
threat domain, malicious insiders can be expected to attempt to hide their actions utilizing
techniques believed to evade detection, usually until their desired objective has been
achieved (Young, Memory, Goldberg, & Senator, 2014). Schultz (2002) defined an
insider attack as “the intentional misuse of computer systems by users who are authorized
to access those systems and networks” (p. 526). Moreover, in numerous insider attacks,
management and co-workers observed that offenders had exhibited signs of stress,
disgruntlement, or had other issues, yet no one raised an alarm (Greitzer, Kangas,
Noonan, & Dalton, 2010). This research aimed at developing a simulated, data-driven,
proof-of-concept prototype that would assist in the evaluation and prediction of malicious
insider threat activity. This was necessary because, as noted by Greitzer, Kangas,
Noonan, Brown, and Ferryman (2014), if these human-centric as well as psychosocial
precursors are evaluated properly and in a timely manner, they could alert an organization
about a developing insider attack.
The remainder of this draft is organized as follows. First, a statement of the
specific research problem this research study will address is presented. Second, the main
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dissertation goal, research questions, as well the relevance and significance of this
research will be discussed. In Chapter 2 a brief literature review of related research is
presented regarding each of the relevant areas: cyber threat vectors, insider threat,
incident response, system security baseline standards and guidelines, cybersecurity
monitoring, as well as, data mining, data modeling, and simulation. Next, specific
barriers and limitations will be discussed. Chapter 3 presents the methodology for this
research study and will outline the specific data analysis that will be used to formulate
user and indicator linear models. Furthermore, Chapter 3 will outline simulated model
development, as well as, the specific model development steps.

Problem Statement
The research problem this study addressed was the imminent challenge to
mitigating cybersecurity insider threats from employees or contractors who may bring
harm to the organization by misusing information systems, computer networks, or data
(Sood, Zeadally, Member, & Bansal, 2015). The threat posed by insiders to organizations
and government agencies has continued to be of serious concern because it can expose
the establishment and their sensitive information (Nurse et al., 2014). Nostro, Ceccarelli,
Bondavalli, and Brancati (2014) stated that it is particularly challenging to identify
insiders and the possible threats they pose to an information system. This is primarily due
to the nature of the attackers, who are often company employees (or employees of an
authorized contractor) motivated by social and economic gains. According to Lindauer,
Glasser, Rosen, and Wallnau (2013), malicious acts carried out by these trusted insiders
include, but are not limited to, theft of intellectual property or national security
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information, fraud, and sabotage. Additionally, within certain critical infrastructures, such
as power grids, communication networks, and transportation services, insider threats are
even more dangerous because they potentially threaten human lives and national security
(Punithavathani, Sujatha, & Jain, 2015). According to Cummings, Lewellen, Mcintire,
Moore, and Trzeciak (2012), insiders they studied needed very little technical
sophistication because they tended to exploit known or newly discovered design flaws.
Cummings et al. (2012) noted that malicious activity was planned in advance, with
organizations suffering financial losses ranging from hundreds, to hundreds of millions of
dollars; these malicious acts were committed during working hours. Almehmadi and Elkhatib (2014) stated that “insiders are the trusted, authorized entities in an organization
who are assigned privileges and know how to navigate through a facility or system and
access valuable materials easily, compared to unauthorized entities” (p. 1). Insider threats
commonly act by exploiting their own user accounts to the capacity of their assigned
privileges and access rights, while abusing their job functions (Fuchs & Gunter, 2010).
At the time of this study, insider threat responses, being largely reactive,
attempted to identify malicious behavior after an event has occurred, therefore, it lacked a
predictive analytic methodology (Greitzer, Frincke, & Zabriskie, 2010). According to
Greitzer and Hohimer (2011), insider threats are manifested within socio-technical
systems, which combine “social, behavioral, and technical factors that interact in
complex ways” (p. 30). According to Greitzer et al. (2009), observations of user behavior
are processed from cyber and psychosocial data that infer indicators, including excessive
access attempts, the presence of automated scripts, registry entries, IDS/IPS events, and
firewall logs. For the purposes of this study, these observations are referred to as “input

4
indicators.” By analyzing input indicators and their relationships in a timely manner,
organizations can be alerted of a developing cyber-attack (Greitzer et al., 2010).
Where no rational relationships to employee activities exist in security event and
information management (SEIM) solutions, tools that monitor psychological indicators,
can help identify employees who exhibit elevated insider threat risk, allowing the
organization to provide assistance to these employees before these situations escalate
(Greitzer et al., 2014). These employee activities and additional input indicators can be
matched with physical security inputs to provide a more robust predictive platform.
Moreover, according to Greitzer et al. (2009), “a benefit of a predictive approach is the
potential for an attentive manager to speak with stressed employees and possibly avert a
cyber incident by addressing underlying problems” (p. 4). Additionally, it has been
observed that in many insider cyber-attacks, supervisors and co-workers recognized that
suspects displayed signs of stress or disgruntlement, yet raised no alarms with senior
management or human resources personnel (Greitzer, Dalton, Kangas, Noonan, &
Hohimer, 2012). Warkentin and Willison (2009) acknowledged that the insider threat has
been repeatedly called the greatest threat to information security, yet is often overlooked
by organizations and the intelligence community, which focus primarily on protecting the
network perimeter from external threats.
Dissertation Goal
The main goal of this research study was to design, develop, and validate a proofof-concept prototype for a malicious cybersecurity insider threat alerting system that
would assist in the detection and prediction of malicious insider threat activity using
human-centric technical activities as well as individual employee psychometric rating
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scales. A prototype is defined as an original model on which something is patterned
(Levy, 2007). Figure 1 depicts an outline and initial design of the proposed Analyticsbased Identifying Insider Cybersecurity Threat in Real-time (AI-InCyThR) system. The
AI-InCyThR system would assist in identifying behaviors, activities, and other inputs as
identified by the expert panel, in an effort to identify at-risk employees and alerting of a
possible cyber-attack before it has materialized.
The need for this work has been demonstrated by the work of Bishop and Carrie
(2008), Greitzer et al. (2008, 2009, 2010, & 2012), Greitzer and Hohimer (2011), Lawton
(2008), as well as Magklaras and Furnell (2002). Greitzer et al. (2012) outlined that
identifying the warning signs of insider threats ahead of a full-blown cyber-attack
requires the communication and coordination of several factors. These include assessing
the capabilities, opportunities, and motivations of an end-user, or the organizational
ability to evaluate risk levels for employees. In addition, Schultz (2002) suggested that
personality factors, particularly introversion, can be used in predicting insider attacks.
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Analytics-based Identifying Insider Cybersecurity Threat in Real-time (AI-InCyThR) System

Proof-of-Concept Prototype

Openness
Conscientiousness
Extroversion
Agreableness

End-User
Big-5 Personality Factors
Psychometric Scale

Information Security
Engineer

Neuroticism
Category 1

End-User Role
Functional Unit

Cybersecurity
Insider Threat
Monitoring
Database
(CyTiMon)

Category 2

Department

Team
Supervisor

E-mail

Organizational Demographic
Information

Category 3
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Word Content Filtering
Analytics
(Email & HTTP Keywords)
Dictionary of
Words for Flagging

Cybersecurity
Insider Risk
Dashboard

HTTP Activity

Logon/Logoff
External Device
File Access

Human Resources and Management Decisions
on Exhibited End-User Behavior

Figure 1. AI-InCyThR Proof-of-Concept Prototype Model
Greitzer and Hohimer (2011) defined several technological sources representative
of host/network cyber data to be monitored for insider threat analysis, which were
integrated with psychometric indicators as presented by Greitzer et al. (2009). The AIInCyThR system aimed to address the problem of insider threat by focusing on both
technical as well as behavioral aspects (Greitzer et al., 2008).
Figure 1 depicts the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype. The proof-ofconcept prototype developed in this study will analyze indicators from two categories,
those being the Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality, and collected simulated data
sources / network resources. The categories can be further delineated into specific
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personality factors, user behavior, and electronic sources. Indicators aggregation and
analysis occurred using the Cybersecurity Threat-Insider Monitoring Database
(CyTiMon). Analyzed and processed data were reviewed by an information security
professional through data visualization for correctness, while providing a real-time
assessment of the network heartbeat for alerting management of unusually suspicious
combination of indicators occurs.
This study aimed to specifically align with Department of Defense (DoD)
Directive Number 5205.16; The DoD Insider Threat Program:
This directive …Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities within DoD to
develop and maintain an insider threat program to comply with the requirements
and minimum standards to prevent, deter, detect, and mitigate actions by
malicious insiders who represent a threat to national security or DoD personnel,
facilities, operations, and resources. (Department of Defense, 2014, p. 1)
This study built on the work of Greitzer et al. (2012) and intended to develop as
well as validate an indicator instrument for the assessment of behaviors and technical
actions related to the potential risk of cybersecurity insider threats. This research aimed to
acquire improved data on the relative distribution, interrelationships, and weight (i.e.
level of importance), with respect to cybersecurity insider threat risks of concerning
behaviors and personal predispositions as noted by Band et al. (2006).
The seven specific goals of this research study are as follows. The first specific
goal of this study was to identify a set of cybersecurity input indicators as pinpointed by
subject matter experts (SMEs), which can help in the identification of precursors to
malicious cybersecurity insider threat activity. The second specific goal of this study was
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to develop a set of cybersecurity events that can be categorized and linked to the SMEidentified set of cybersecurity input indicators. The third specific goal of this study was to
identify expert-approved weights (i.e. level of importance) for the SME-identified
cybersecurity input indicators. The fourth specific goal of this study was to establish the
expert identified most significant correlations between cybersecurity input indicators. The
fifth specific goal of this research was to determine which of the identified cybersecurity
input indicators display a high rate of false positives or false negatives. The sixth specific
goal of this research was to recognize which of the simulated user activity indicators were
identified by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as significant input indicators
to identify insider threat activity. Therefore, the seventh specific goal this research was to
establish which simulated user activity correlations were identified by the SME’s
different that those identified by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as
significant to identify insider threat activity.

Research Questions
The main research question this study addressed was: What human-centric
technical activity and psychometric indicators are precursors to malicious end-user
activity, making those activities rise above a certain threshold to be identified as potential
insider threats? The specific research questions (RQ) this study addressed, as seen in
Figure 2, were:
RQ1: What are the important cybersecurity indicators validated by the expert
panel that can assist in the detection of insider threat activity?
RQ2: What are the expert-validated cybersecurity indicator categories?
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RQ3: What are the expert-approved weights for the identified cybersecurity
indicators?
RQ4: What are the expert-identified most significant correlations between
cybersecurity indicators?
RQ5a: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to
have a high rate of false positives as measured by the AI-InCyThR
prototype?
RQ5b: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to
have a high rate of false negatives as measured by the AI-InCyThR
prototype?
RQ6: What simulated user activity indicators were identified by the AI-InCyThR
proof-of-concept prototype as significant indicators to identify insider
threat activity?
RQ7: How are the simulated user activity correlations that were identified by the
SMEs different than those identified by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept
prototype as significant to identify insider threat activity?

Relevance and Significance
Relevance
This research study was relevant as it sought to gain a better understanding of
how additional categorized cybersecurity indicators can assist in identifying potential
malicious activity and motivating circumstances. Precise identification of malicious
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activity can significantly affect the accuracy and validity of a SIEM solution, assisting in
the mitigation of an insider threat incident through real-time alerts and visualization. This
is supported in the literature on a study conducted by Greitzer et al. (2012), who
determined that a model of insider threat risk can be developed to produce predictions
that are highly correlated with expert judgments (p. 2400). This research is also supported
by the work of Hashem, Takabi, Ghasemigol, and Dantu (2016), who demonstrated that it
is “almost impossible to stop the insider threat attack at the gate” (p. 33), as well as, that a
user-centric monitoring and detection framework is needed for the early detection of
malicious insider threat activity. According to Bishop, Nance, and Claycomb (2017),
“analyzing and detecting insider threats involve both technical and non-technical
approaches across many different disciplines, including human-oriented ones” (p. 2637),
this research aimed at analyzing both technical and psychometric indicators for the
detection of potential malicious cybersecurity insider threat attacks. Various case studies
using human-centric indicators must be considered to measure precursors to insider threat
activity; specifically, in an environment where some tasks may be performed manually,
while other may be computer based (Greitzer et al., 2012; Gritzalis, Stavrou, Kandias, &
Stergiopoulos, 2014).
Significance
This research study was significant in that it advanced contemporary research in
insider threat detection, as well as, facilitate an increase in the cybersecurity body of
knowledge. In regard to how SIEM solutions integrate human-centric input feeds with
technical input feeds, this study identified employee technical activity correlations,
coupled with the employees psychometric rating, to assist in the detection of an insider
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threat attack. As noted by Hazari, Hargrave, and Clenney (2008), there is a human
element to information security that deals with psychology, motivation, education, and
social aspects. According to West (2008), “understanding these principles on how users
come to make decisions about security may suggest places where we can improve the
outcome of the decisions” (p. 36). This research was significant in that it contributed to
fulfilling the need for a more thorough validation of insider threat models and tools as
expressed by Greitzer et al. (2010). Additionally, this research contributes to combating
insider threats through the development of methods and models for analyzing suspicious
computer activities that may predict insider attacks (Greitzer et al., 2010).

Barriers and Issues
One potential barrier for this research study was obtaining the permission
necessary to survey cybersecurity industry experts for determining input indicators.
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval is required to survey study participants.
Approval was obtained in advance to conduct the study with input from industry experts.
This study required a minimum of 15 SMEs per round of data collection. Therefore, to
minimize the feasibility of a low response rate, 336 SMEs were contacted for both Delphi
1 and Delphi 2, during Phase 1 of this research study.
The use of simulated data was another potential barrier. While simulated data
gives researchers greater control over the simulation environment, Hill and Malone
(2004) explained that the use of simulated data can have significant effects on the results.
According to them, “models that are either too clean and well behaved or are unrealistic
with respect to error and other real-world characteristics can provide misleading results”
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(Hill & Malone, 2004, p. 972). This was mitigated by the use of benchmarking from
similar studies, which provided a point of reference in the data analysis (Hill & Malone
2004; Sekeran, 2003).
Another issue that may have arisen was model validity. Validation has to do with
determining whether or not a simulation model is an acceptable and accurate
representation of reality (Giannasi, Lovett, & Godwin, 2001). According to Martis
(2006), when working with simulation models, some things to consider include: 1) a
model should be assessed for its usefulness, rather than its absolute validity 2) if a model
cannot have absolute validity, however, it should be valid for purposes for which it was
intended; and 3) as a model passes its various test assurances, validity in that model is
heightened. As a result, using the proof-of-concept prototype, a series of tests performed
on the simulation data compared with benchmarks outlined in similar studies and
literature, progressed this study towards successful research level design and
development.
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
1. It was assumed that cybersecurity SMEs were ethical and honest in their
responses.
2. It was assumed that a significant majority of the cybersecurity SMEs would have
participated in all three phases of SME-required data collection.
3. It was assumed that the simulated user activity data set was sufficient for the
necessary analysis and indicator correlation exercises.
Limitations
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Since the Delphi technique is a multi-round study, much time is required, so
some participants will, inevitably, not continue with the Delphi process, complicating
data collection (Gordon, 2009). This may have served as a limitation. As an incentive for
continued participation, Scheele (1975) suggested that researchers consider “in kind”
gifts for participation, which the study sponsor can provide at moderate cost. According
to Ellis and Levy (2010), another possible limitation is the expert opinions collected
during the Delphi technique process, since these opinions are limited to the members
recruited. To elaborate further, as explained by Linstone and Turoff (2002), expert
opinions are “nearly always unconsciously biased” (p. 567). In order to mitigate this
limitation, it was ensured that there was representation from all relevant groups within the
specific field for the expert panel (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). Another potential limitation
of this research study was assuring that the study remained within its accepted parameters
and scope.
Developmental research is distinguished from product development by a focus on
complex, innovative solutions that have few, if any, accepted design and
development principles; a comprehensive grounding in the literature and theory;
empirical testing of a product’s practicality and effectiveness; as well as, thorough
documentation, analysis, along with reflection on processes and outcomes. (Ellis
& Levy, 2009, p. 328)
As noted by Ellis and Levy (2008), while the research problem serves as the
starting point, the literature review serves as the foundation from which the research is
built. Incorporating the findings from the literature review, with expert panel
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recommendations elicited through the Delphi technique, progressed this study towards a
successful research level design and development effort.
Measuring the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype analysis against simulated
data may have been another possible limitation. Due to the nature of the simulated data,
the rate of false positives and false negatives may threaten the validity and reliability of
any malicious cybersecurity insider threat precursors detected. To mitigate this limitation,
a longitudinal baseline was created where simulated user activities were broadcast over a
period of time, and predictions of the model were compared to simulated observed events
(Greitzer et al., 2012). Additionally, a continuous review of the data recorded along with
its respective scoring and weighting ensured that participants’ responses as well as
indicator weight assignments were correctly applied prior to conducting the empirical
study.

Delimitations
A possible delimitation of this study is that it was limited to a single set of
simulated data. Moreover, that many study’s Delphi participants were limited to a single,
higher education institution. The responses of the participants may be a delimitation of
the study, as institutional culture may have affected how participants answer questions
and weigh activity indicators.

Definition of Terms
The following represents terms and definitions.
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Biclustering – “a popular technique, which allows simultaneous clustering of the rows
and columns of a matrix” (Reddy & Aziz, 2010, p. 4)
Correlation Clustering – “a special type of clustering which defines the similarity
between objects in terms of correlation between features, that is, it is a clustering
approach which assigns two data points to the same cluster” (Reddy & Aziz, 2010, p. 4)
Correlation Coefficient – a type of statistical measure that indicates the magnitude of
relationship between two variables, while also showing how the two variables interact
with each other (Ambusaidi et al., 2014)
Data Matrix – “an organization of raw scores or data, where the rows represent subjects,
or cases, and columns represent variables” (Mertler & Vanetta, 2010, p. 3)
Data Mining – a process of discovering hidden patterns and information from the
existing data, as well, cleaning the data so as to make it feasible for further processing
(PhridviRaj & GuruRao, 2014)
Data Visualization – “the use of images to represent information” (Few, 2007, p. 2)
Delphi – “a method for structuring a group communication process so that the process is
effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem”
(Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004, p. 16)
Holt-Winter Method – a method which allows data to be modeled by a local mean, a
local trend and a local seasonal factor which are all updated by exponential smoothing
(Chatfield & Yar, 1988)
Incident Response – “is the reaction to an identified occurrence whereby responders
classify an incident, (then) investigate and contain the incident” (Brennan & Jolo, 2015,
p. 2)
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Indicators – documented employee behaviors, intellectual property, employee activity
on networks, information on organizational property networks, and information
technology (IT) architecture (Costa et al., 2014, p. 1)
Information Security Event – the identified occurrence of a system, service, or network
state indicating a possible breach of information security, policy or failure or controls, or
a previously unknown situation that may be security relevant (International Standards
Organization, 2011)
Information Security Incident – a single or series of unwanted or unexpected
information security events that have a significant probability of compromising business
operations and threatening security (International Standards Organization, 2011)
Information Visualization – the transformation of data into a visual representation, so
that users can better understand the data (Brunetti, Auer, García, Klímek, & Nečaský,
2013)
Insider Threat – “a trusted entity that is given the power to violate one or more rules in a
given security policy… the insider threat occurs when a trusted entity abuses that power”
(Bishop, 2005, p. 1)
Malicious Insider Threat – “a current or former employee, contractor, or business
partner who meets the following criteria: has or had authorized access to an
organization’s network, system, or data; has intentionally exceeded or intentionally used
that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of the organization’s information or information systems” (Silowash et al.,
2012, p. 2)
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Motivation – the key influencers on behavior though other options are available
(Tolman, 1938)
Multivariate data – “consists of more than one dimension/variable, where each axis
represents a variable of the data set. The N-axis are drawn as vertical lines with equal
spacing, and each data element displayed as is a series of connected points along the
dimensions” (Steinparz, Abmair, Bauer, & Feiner, 2010, p. 2).
Mutual Information – a generalized correlation analogous to a linear correlation
coefficient, but sensitive to any relationship, including nonlinear correlations (Roulston,
1999)
Nonlinear Correlation Coefficient – “a method based on mutual information, which is a
quantity measuring the relationship between two discreet random variables” (Ambusaidi
et al., 2014, p. 80)
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient – “one of the basic linear correlation methods used to
measure dependence between two variables” (Ambusaidi et al., 2014, p. 79)
Precursor – “an activity that, when observed, flags the associated user as a potential
malicious insider. Each precursor can be assigned a score, which reflects the extent to
which the precursor identifies classifies someone as a malicious insider” (Marty, 2008, p.
393).
Proper Linear Model – “one in which the weights given to the predictor variables are
chosen in such a way as to optimize the relationship between the prediction and the
criterion” (Dawes, 1979, p. 571)
Principle Curves – “nonlinear summarizations of multidimensional data points
represented by a smooth, one-dimensional curve” (Reddy & Aziz, 2010, p. 4)
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Risk Based IT Auditing – an institution’s ability to report and detect important risk
factors in an approach that focuses on the response of the organization to the risks it faces
in achieving its goals and objectives (Lovaas, 2009, p. 485)
Synthetic Data – “data that are generated by simulated users in a simulated system,
performing simulated actions; simulations may involve human actions to some extent or
be an entirely automated process” (Barse, Kvarnstrom, & Johnson, 2003, p. 2)
Summary
The research problem that this study addressed was the imminent challenge to
mitigate cybersecurity insider threats from employees or contractors who may pose harm
to the organization by misusing the information systems, computer networks, or data
(Sood et al., 2015). To address this research problem, this study has set a main goal to
design, develop, and validate, using SMEs, a proof-of-concept prototype for a malicious
cybersecurity insider threat alerting system that would assist in the detection and
prediction of malicious insider threat activity. For the purposes of this study, the SMEs
were not the end-users of the prototype. The SMEs who participated in this study were
validating both the technical and psychometric input indicators required for the detection
of precursors to malicious cybersecurity insider threat activity.
This developmental research study was conducted in three phases of data
collection and analysis. During Phase 1, this developmental study conducted Delphi
method data collection from SMEs to validate, as well as, assign, weights to technical
activity and psychometric cybersecurity indicators for measuring malicious cybersecurity
insider threat activity, as identified in the literature and NIST Special Publications. Thus,
in Phase 2, this developmental study added the aforementioned developed and validated
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technical activity and psychometric indicators into the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept
prototype that was used to collect the simulated user activity data, refine the data
identifying false positives and negatives, as well as, measure indicators, indicator
correlations, and indicator weights on over several million simulated user activity logs,
representing a span of over a year and a half of the simulated user activity on a private
network. Therefore, in Phase 3 of this developmental study, an analysis was performed of
the collected evidence and indicator relationships against a previously identified
Minimum Security Baseline (MSB), as well as, establish an over detection of accuracy of
predicted malicious cybersecurity events. Subsequently, a conclusive report with
conclusions and recommendations was produced.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
Introduction
To lay the theoretical foundation for this developmental research study, this
chapter will provide a synopsis of the literature relevant to not only malicious
cybersecurity insider threats, but also to data simulation considerations, high-level
technical and psychosocial indicators, as well as, cyber threats. As noted by Pare, Trudel,
Jaana, and Kitsiou (2015), “the literature review section helps the researcher understand
the existing body of knowledge and provides a theoretical foundation for the proposed
empirical study” (p. 183). Moreover, an effective literature review assists the researcher
in identifying where new research is needed, as well as, justifies the study as one that
contributes something new to the body of knowledge (Levy & Ellis, 2006).
To ensure breadth, depth, and rigor in this study, a search of the Information
Systems (IS) literature domain was conducted using several databases of interdisciplinary
fields, including IS, business, and psychology. This literature review process revealed
existing cybersecurity knowledge, technical, as well as, psychosocial indicators, and
research gaps, along with the theoretical foundations for this research study of validating,
developing, as well as empirically testing technical and psychosocial indicators as
precursors to malicious cybersecurity insider threats. Furthermore, information on
exercising the expert methodology is presented.

21
Cyber Threat Vectors
Impact of Cyber Threats
As reported by IBM Security (2016), in taking a holistic view of targeted
industries, “it is clear that virtually no industry was immune to the exploits of today’s
attackers” (p. 3). Most organizations are well aware of the dangers posed by cyber
attacks; however, to date, the Federal Government has no well-developed, nor publicly
known strategy for deterring these types of attacks (Kugler, 2009). Should attackers
disrupt or destroy infrastructures – such as the energy grid, clean drinking water supply,
communications, and public transportation – on which society heavily relies, the residual
effects on the health and safety of citizens may be severe (Luiijf, 2012). As clarified by
Luiijf (2012), these frameworks are considered Critical Infrastructures (CI) and their
undisturbed functioning is highly dependent on the security of their underlying support
systems, such as information assets, as well as, internal and external communication
links. As suggested by Awan, Burnap, and Rana (2016), because of the sophistication of
new and evolving attacks, network-level defenses alone do not suffice as an overall
information security plan. Governments, organizations, and individuals may very easily
become the victims of cyber crimes as well as, becoming unknowing assistants to cyber
criminals (Awan et al., 2016), thus, contributing even more to the insider threat
phenomenon.
Relating to existing cybersecurity terminology, Verizon (2016) identified an
incident as “a security event that compromises the integrity, confidentiality, or
availability of an information asset” (p. 5). Similarly, Verizon (2016) identified a breach
as “an incident that results in the confirmed disclosure (not just potential exposure) of
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data to an unauthorized party” (p. 5). While there are many different types of cyber
attacks and adversaries, the 2016 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (VDBIR)
issued by Verizon identified “nine reoccurring combinations of the, who (actors), what
(assets), how (actions), and why (motives) among other incident characteristics” (p. 22),
not including miscellaneous errors. The items in these reocurring combinations are noted
as 1) privilege misuse, 2) physical theft/loss, 3) denialofservice, 4) everything else, 5)
crimeware, 6) web application attacks, 7) POS intrusions/payment card skimmers, 8)
cyberespionage, 9) miscellaneous errors.
Table 1
Literature Summary of Impact of Cyber Threats
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Awan et al.,
2015

Empirical
study

462,787
network traffic
instances, 278
unique threats,
6 categories

Network
analysis

Development of a
risk assessment
framework for
managing network
security risk

IBM Security,
2015

Empirical
observations

8000 client
devices, from
100 countries

Security
awareness

Cyber strategy,
prioritizing
security objectives,

Kugler, 2009

Case study

Compilation of
U.S.
cybersecurity
guidelines

Analytical
methods and
metrics used in
decision
making for
cyber-attack
deterrence

Ascertained the
need for an
extended cyber
deterrence strategy
for the U.S. and its
allies
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Table 1
Literature Summary of Impact of Cyber Threats (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Luijff, 2012

Literature
review

Verizon, 2016

Case study

Sample

100,000
incidents, of
which 3,141,
were
confirmed data
breeches

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Critical
infrastructure
information
(CII)

Taxonomy of
threats, attack
actors, and motives
in reference to CII

68 contributing
organizations

9 attack vectors
identified in 2014
remain prevalent in
cyber-attacks,
actions taken by an
adversary are not
exclusive to any
single pattern

Major Types of Cyber Threats
According to Randazzo, Keeney, Kowalski, Cappelli, and Moore (2005), statistics
vary on the frequency of cyber attacks carried out by insiders, compared with those cyber
attacks carried out by actors external to the target organization. To defend against
external cyber attacks, organizations can implement physical and technical security
measures, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and authentication
mechanisms (Andersen et al., 2004). As noted by Carlin (2016), “knowing which specific
computer or network caused the malicious activity doesn’t necessarily tell you which
person or organization ordered, carried out, or supported the hack” (p. 387). This study
followed the example of Greitzer el al. (2009) in developing a proof-of-concept prototype
that utilizes a predictive modeling approach by analyzing psychosocial and cyber
indicators. Accurately identified cyber indicators can be utilized to correctly assess not
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only cyber activity on a network, but also an employee’s behavior and possible malicious
actions.
Table 2
Literature Summary of Major Types of Cyber Threats
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding
or Contribution

Anderson et
al., 2004

Case study

Six insider
threat cases

Cybersecurity
insider threat
detection

Systemic
approach to
cybersecurity:
polices and
procedures to
mitigate insider
threat attack

Carlin, 2016

Conceptual
paper

U.S. federal
cybersecurity
guidelines

Cyber-attack
deterrence

Presented a
whole-ofgovernment
approach to
cyber threats

Randazzo et
al., 2005

Aggregated
case-study
analysis

23 incidents
carried out by
26 insiders in
the banking
and financial
sector

Cybersecurity
insider threat
detection

Information
development of
commonalities
within the cases
studied

External Attacks
Christ (2007) illustrated how computer based cyber attacks have evolved over
time, where network-based attacks have been replaced by more sophisticated Web
applications or by externally based attacks. One of the most common external attacks
floods a target system with data requests, overloading the resource and rendering it
inaccessible, this is known as a Denial of Service (DoS) (Meyers, Powers, & Faissol,
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2009). The DoS attack is intended to compromise the availability of networks and
systems, to include both network resources and applications (Verizon, 2016). By
overwhelming a system, the DoS attack degrades service or causes a complete service
interruption. However, Werlinger, Muldner, Hawkey, and Beznosov (2010) mentioned
that diagnosing a DoS was undemanding because it could be achieved by the inspection
of specific network activity, since DoS is sending the same data packets or requests over
and over again. In comparison, a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) “is a coordinated
attack on the availability of services of a given target system or network that is launched
indirectly through many compromised computing systems” (Specht & Lee, 2004, p. 543).
According to Carlin (2016), in March of 2016, the U.S. Government had identified and
publicly charged a group of Iranian hackers with carrying out a DDoS directed at the U.S.
financial sector, which affected 46 financial institutions over the course of 176 days. The
attack disrupted the financial institutions’ online services for hundreds of thousands of
Americans, who in turn were unable to process any online banking transactions (Carlin,
2016).
Other Web-based attacks include the SQL injection (SQLi), where the
vulnerability in lack of input validation allows malicious actors to issue SQL commands
via the Web application interface or Website, to issue illicit commands to the database
(IBM Security, 2016; Verizon, 2016). According to Symantec’s 2016 Internet Security
Threat Report, at the time of this study, Website owners were still not patching or
updating their servers accordingly, leaving vulnerabilities for malicious actors to exploit
(Symantec, 2016). The report also indicated that more than three-quarters of the Websites
scanned had unpatched vulnerabilities, where one in seven, or 15%, were categorized as
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“critical” in 2015 (Symantec, 2016). These Web-based and external vulnerabilities allow
for a host of other threats to impact an organization’s information systems assets.
Table 3
Literature Summary of External Attacks
Study

Methodology

Carlin, 2016

Christ, 2016

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding
or Contribution

Literature
review and
synthesis

Cybersecurity
threats and
vulnerabilities

Development a
strategy to
disrupt
national cyber
threats

Conceptual
paper

Web-based
attack
mitigation

Defense-indepth approach
using
technology and
user awareness

IBM
Security,
2016

Case study

Compilation of Cybersecurity
8000 client
threats and
devices in over vulnerabilities
100 countries

Myers et al.,
2009

Literature
review and
synthesis

Cyber threats
and
vulnerabilities

Prioritization of
business
objectives and
risk tolerance
needed to face
cyber risks
Taxonomy of
cyber
adversaries,
corresponding
methods, and
skill level

Table 3
Literature Summary of External Attacks (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding
or Contribution
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Specht &
Lee, 2004

Literature
review and
synthesis

DDoS attacks

Taxonomies to
characterize the
scope of DDoS
attacks

Symantec,
2016

Case study

74,180
vulnerabilities,
from 23,908
vendors, and
71,470
products

Cyber threats

Provided a
series of best
practice
guidelines for
consumers

Verizon,
2016

Case study

Culmination of Cyber
Fortune 500
breaches
companies

Introduced
Vocabulary for
Event
Recording and
Incident Sharing
(VERIS)
framework

Werlinger et
al., 2010

Empirical
study

16 participant
organizations

Illustrated the
importance of
the preparation,
detection, and
analysis phases
participation

Cybersecurity
incident
response and
mitigation

Malware, Spyware, Worms, Bots, and Viruses
Malicious software, known as malware, “has consistently been ranked as one of
the key cyber threats to businesses, governments, and individuals” (Choo, 2011, p. 721).
By definition, the term malware describes a classification of malicious code which
changes the behavior of the operating system kernel, without user consent and in such a
way that those changes cannot be detected without using the documentation feature of the
operating system or other security applications (Rutkowska, 2006). Choo (2011)
explained that malware can be categorized into two classifications, generic malware
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intended toward the general public, and malware that has been coded for information
stealing, pointed at specific organizations.
According to Meyers et al. (2009), a computer virus is a malicious program that
has the ability to copy itself without the knowledge of the end-user. As Meyers et al.
(2009) explained, “viruses are transferred when their host is connected with the target
system, either via a computer network, the Internet, or a form of removable media” (p.
14). Similarly, a worm is described as autonomous malicious code that has the ability to
propagate on its own, contains different payloads, and has no need to attach itself to
existing files or programs (HPE Security Research, 2016; Meyers et al., 2009).
In comparison, a bot, originating from the word “robot,” is a specific application that can
perform certain tasks faster than humans can; when many bots are dispersed to several
computers across the Internet and connect with each other, they form a botnet (Eslahi,
Salleh, & Anuar, 2013). The term botnet is used to describe a framework of hosts
infected with malicious code “that are under the control of a human operator commonly
known as the botmaster” (Abu Rajab, Zarfoss, Monrose, & Terzis, 2006, p. 1). In regards
to botnets as global threats, Pilling (2013) illustrated how Cutwail, one of the largest
botnets, is used to impersonate very well-known online retailers, mobile service
providers, social networking sites (SNS), and financial institutions (p. 14). According to
Pilling (2013), Cutwail is one of the primary methods for the deployment of malware
downloaders, with anywhere from “175,000 to 500,000 active bots on any given day”
(Pilling, 2013, p. 14). Pilling (2013) further elaborated on Cutwail’s popularity being due
to malicious actors with easy access to Cutwail’s spam-as-a-service infrastructure.
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Table 4
Literature Summary of Malware, Spyware, Worms, Bots, and Viruses
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Abu Rajab et
al., 2006

Empirical
study and
longitudinal
tracking of IRC
botnets

3-month
examination of
800,000 DNS
domains

Malicious
botnet
infection

Botnets are an
overall
contributor to
unwanted traffic
on the Internet

Choo, 2011

Theoretical

Cyber threat
landscape

Applied routine
activity theory
can be
implemented to
reduce the
opportunities for
cyber crime

Eslahi, 2013

Literature
review and
synthesis

Cybersecurity
threat
protection

Overview of
botnet
characteristics as
well as, their
malicious
activities

HPE Security
Research, 2016

Case study

Data collected Cyber threat
by HPE
landscape
Security, open
source
intelligence,
ReversingLabs,
and Sonatype

Overview of
threat landscape
encompassing
several types of
attacks as well
as, legislative
burdening on
mitigation and
research

Table 4
Literature Summary of Malware, Spyware, Worms, Bots, and Viruses (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution
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Meyers, 2009

Literature
review and
analysis

Cyber
adversaries and
attacks

Proposed cyberadversary
taxonomy

Pilling, 2013

Theoretical

Cybersecurity
threat
protection

Global cyber
threats

Rutkowska,
2006

Literature
review and
analysis

Cyber
adversaries and
attacks

Proposed
taxonomy to
categorize stealth
malware

Social Engineering (Phishing, Vishing, & Impersonation)
It has been well documented both in research and among organizations that their
employees are the weakest link in information security (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, &
Benbasat, 2010). Malicious actors exploit the weakness in end-users or employees by
obtaining information from them under false pretenses and manipulation; this process is
called social engineering. As reported by AT&T Security (2015), cybercriminals are
becoming more sophisticated by exploiting an individual’s information published on
social media. This information can be used by malicious actors to appear to be the user’s
friend. As such, masquerading as a known and trusted person is an attempt to gain an
employee’s password or obtain other access through trickery or exploitation of the trusted
relationship (Silowash et al., 2012).
Sood et al. (2015) explained how indirect attacks, such as social engineering, use
other techniques like phishing, which “force users to visit the embedded links in phishing
emails” (p. 8). In these type of social attacks, a victim is sent a spoofed email modeled
after a real email, claiming to be from a coworker, bank, social network, or even an entity
offering a “needed” software upgrade (Bowen, Devarajan, & Stolfo, 2011). Bowen et al.
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(2011) elaborated on this technique, saying, “when the victim takes the bait, they are
often greeted with some form of malicious software that attempts to install itself on the
victim’s machine” (p. 2). According to Verizon (2016), “the main perpetrators for
phishing attacks are organized crime syndicates and state-affiliated actors” (p. 18). The
Verizon 2016 DBIR indicated that in 2015, there were 9,576 incidents reported, with 916
of these incidents confirming data disclosure. Verizon (2016) concluded that the main
cause of these type of breaches is a failure of communication between the victim and the
organizational staff, noting the need for much more effective communication between the
victim and the IT staff.
Vishing, derived from “voice” and “phishing,” is where a “phone call is received
with the attacker luring the receiver into providing personal information with the
intention to cause harm” (Yeboah-Boateng & Amanor, 2014, p. 297). Due to the nature
of telephony, the technology, be it land, mobile, or Internet Protocol (IP)-based, is
susceptible to malicious vishing attacks, specifically because of its social and
technological reach (Ollmann, 2007). Maggi (2010) emphasized that Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) is not a secure protocol, and illustrated how criminals can take advantage
of these vulnerabilities by spoofing and impersonating call identifiers. Cyber attacks are
carried out in a sophisticated manner, in which malicious actors use social engineering to
bypass traditional two-factor authentication. In one such attack, as reported by Symantec
(2016), malicious actors impersonated tax officials in an attempt to get individuals to
download malicious email attachments. Malicious actors not only have the ability to
impersonate outside entities, they also aim at assuming the identity of legitimate parties
in a system, or by using trusted communication protocols. In the impersonation attack,
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the adversary successfully assumes the identity of the target to carry out malicious
activity (Adams, 2011). This research study focused on deliberate attacks, rather than
accidental ones, and defined the malicious insider as noted by Cummings, Lewellen,
Mcintire, Moore, and Trzeciak (2012):
A current or former employee, contractor, or other business partner who has or
had authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data and
intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner that negatively affected
the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization’s information or
information systems. (p. vii)
This study took into consideration the concerns of Kugler (2009), Luiijf (2012), and
Awan et al. (2016) in creating a prototype that can be used to assist in the detection of
malicious activities by those individuals with trusted access to organizational information
resources.
Table 5
Literature Summary of Social Engineering (Phishing, Vishing, & Impersonation)
Study

Methodology

Adams, 2011

Literature
review

AT&T
Security

Conceptual
paper

Sample

Visibility into 10
petabytes of
traffic daily

Instrument or Main Finding or
Construct
Contribution
Security
literacy

Clarified the term
“identification”
within the
cybersecurity
scope

Social
engineering

Identified
phishing as a
precursor to social
engineering
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Awan et al.,
2016

Empirical
study

462,787 instances
representing
threats over 144
hours

Computer
network risk

Proposed a risk
assessment
framework that
allows for high
level view of
network security

Bowen et al.,
2011

Empirical
study

500 phishing
emails sent to
4,000 users

Social
engineering

Identified that
users can be
trained using
bogus phishing
emails

Bulgurku et
al., 2010

Empirical
study

11 graduate
students

Cybersecurity
compliance

Demonstrated
rationality based
factors that drive
employees to
information
security policy
compliance

Cummings et
al., 2012

Empirical
study

Interviews with
law enforcement
and banking
investigators
involved in 80
insider fraud
cases

Social
engineering

Presented insider
fraud models to
establish
countermeasures
in. insider IT
sabotage, insider
theft of IP, and
national security
espionage

Table 5
Literature Summary of Social Engineering (Phishing, Vishing, & Impersonation) (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Kugler, 2009

Conceptual
paper

Sample

Instrument or Main Finding or
Construct
Contribution
Cyber threat
deterrence

Identified the
need for a
national cyber
deterrence
strategy
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Maggi, 2010

Empirical
study

Ollman, 2007

Conceptual
paper

Silowash et
al., 2012

Best practices
guide

Sood et al.,
2015

Literature
review and
synthesis

Symantec,
2016

Best practices
guide

PhonePhising.info Vishing (voice
data set
phising)

Several industry,
federal, and
international
standards

23,980 vendors
representing over
71,470 products

Analysis of
vishing reports
submitted by
victims

Vishing (voice
phising)

Identified IP
telephony and
vishing as the
next cyber-attack
platform

Insider threat

Describes 19
practices to
prevent and
detect insider
threats

Attacks
through
socioware and
insider threat

Taxonomy of
malware
infestations and
the use of socio
ware by insider
threats

Cybersecurity
threats

Presents best
practices
guidelines
against Internet
threats

Table 5
Literature Summary of Social Engineering (Phishing, Vishing, & Impersonation) (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or Main Finding or
Construct
Contribution

Verizon,
2016

Case study

100,000 incidents, 68
of which 3,141,
contributing
were confirmed
organizations
data breeches

9 attack vectors
remain prevalent
in cyber-attacks,
adversary actions
not exclusive to
any single pattern
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YeboahBoateng &
Amanor,
2014

Empirical
study

Investigation of
various types of
attacks on mobile
devices

SMishing and
vishing attacks

Taxonomy of
alluring and
decoying words
used in phishing
attacks

Insider Threat
Malicious Insiders
According to Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda, and Kiountouzis (2005), an
insider threat is one that “originating from people who have been given access rights to
an information system (IS) and misuse their privileges, thus violating the IS security
policy of the organization” (p. 473). Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering
Institute (SEI) identified the malicious insider “as a current or former employee,
contractor, or business partner that has or had authorized access to an organizations
network, system or data” (Silowash et al., 2012). Silowash et al. (2012) further explained
that malicious insiders have “intentionally exceeded or intentionally used that access in a
manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability (CIA) of the
organizations information or information systems” (p. 8). At the time of this study,
insider threats have been minimally addressed by standard security practices, yet the
insider poses one of the most serious threats to organizations through any number of
malicious activities (Punithavathani et al., 2015). Nurse et al. (2014) noted, “it is widely
accepted that there are a myriad of insider incidents that will go unreported (for fear of
organizational reputation), or will go unnoticed as the attacks avoid detection” (p. 214).
Due to the nature of insider threats, malicious insiders are expected to hide their actions
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with techniques they believe will avoid detection, until they have accomplished their
goals (Young et al., 2014).
What contributes most to malicious insiders’ exigency is that they have in-depth
knowledge of the inner workings of their organization, and have the necessary privileges
to access sensitive information (Agrafiotis, Legg, Goldsmith, & Creese, 2014). This
understanding of the insider threat vector is further supported in the literature by Ho et al.
(2015) who acknowledged, “a malicious insider has the distinct advantage of
understanding the corporation’s information assets, processes, and infrastructure” (p.
102). Claycomb, Legg, and Gollmann (2013) noted, “consequences of insider attacks
include compromised organizational security, financial loss, and risk to human health and
safety” (p. 1). Malicious insiders are capable of stealing intellectual property, disrupting
organizational IT systems operations, or using organizational IT systems for financial
fraud operations (Claycomb et al., 2013).
Table 6
Literature Summary of Malicious Insiders
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Agrafiotis et
al., 2014

Empirical
study

CMU
simulated
data set

Cybersecurity
insider threat

Proposed a
sequential analysis
approach for insider
threat detection

Claycomb et
al., 2013

Literature
review and
synthesis

Cybersecurity
insider threat

Identified gaps in
research regarding
the relationship
between anomalous
and malicious
behavior

Ho et al.,

Empirical

Language

Identified the use of

Online
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2015

Nurse et al.,
2014

study

Case study
and literature
review

gaming
used in group
environment dynamics

language cues in
group dynamics after
insider threat
compromise

Grounded
theory
approach
based on the
review of 80
insider threat
cases

Cybersecurity
insider threat
detection

Developed a
framework that
identifies
elements within
the insider threat
problem to
include
motivation behind
malicious threats

Punithavathani, Empirical
2015
study

Real time
values
comprised of
simulated
systems

Cybersecurity
insider threat
detection

Developed a twophased
surveillance
mechanism for
insider threat
detection

Randazzo et
al., 2005

23 incidents
Cybersecurity
carried out by insider threat
26 insiders in detection
the financial
sector

Aggregated
case-study
analysis

Information
development of
commonalities
within the cases
studied

Table 6
Literature Summary of Malicious Insiders (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Silowash, et
al., 2012

Empirical
study

700 insider
threat cases

Cybersecurity
insider threat
prevention

Introduced 6 key
groups necessary
for a successful
insider threat
program

Theoharidou et
al., 2005

Literature
review and
analysis

Criminology
theories and
their relation
to ISO 17799

Cyber threats

Identified
incorporating
criminology
theories into
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cybersecurity
management
Young et al.,
2014

Empirical
study

Test database Cybersecurity
of 5,500 users insider threat
detection

Developed an
ensemble-based,
unsupervised
technique for
detecting
potential insider
threat instances

Observable Behavior
It has also been noted in the literature that an insider attack is often preceded by
observable behaviors consisting of indicators to current or future malicious behavior
(Claycomb et al., 2013; Greitzer et al., 2012). In the work of Greitzer and Frincke (2010),
incoming data is processed to infer observations; observations are processed to infer
indicators; and indicators are assessed to gauge threat (p. 8). An example of a technical
observation is data that represents the activities of an employee’s network account, such
as outgoing or incoming Web traffic, or data connections through a firewall per IP
mapped back to the user’s network account (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010). On the other
hand, while more fragmented, human resources data provides a multitude of contextual,
behavioral, and psychosocial information regarding employees (Costa et al., 2014). This
data as outlined by Costa et al. (2014) included organizational charts, employee
performance reviews, employee personnel files, employee behavior records, information
from anonymous insider reporting channels, and results from background checks. The
combination of several of these factors, “if properly evaluated in a timely manner, could
alert an organization about a developing insider crime” (Greitzer et al., 2014, p. 109). In
the work of Greitzer et al. (2012), a psychosocial model was developed to assess an

39
employee’s increased susceptibility to becoming an inside abuser. According to Greitzer
et al. (2012), in many insider threat cases, managers and coworkers observed that the
offender had exhibited signs of stress, disgruntlement, or other issues, yet no one
questioned the behavior or raised an alarm. This research aimed at filling that gap by
introducing a mechanism within the AI-InCyThR system proof-of-concept prototype,
where a combination of an employee’s FFM and technical activity were input as
indicators to the system. The data captured was analyzed within the proof-of-concept
prototype for correlation to validate the expert panel identified indicators.
Table 7
Literature Summary of Observable Behavior
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Costa et al.,
2014

Empirical
study

800 insider
threat cases

Cyber threat
indicators

Developed an
ontology for
insider threat
indicators

Greitzer et
al., 2010

Empirical
study

HR experts
and managers

Cyber threat
indicators

Developed a
predictive
modeling
approach using
threat indicators
preceding an
insider threat
attack

Greitzer et
al., 2014

Empirical
study

Expert
judgements

Psychosocial
indicators

Developed a
prototype
psychosocial
model that assess
behavioral
indicators
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Insiders as Adversaries and Cyber Adversarial Thinking
Randazzo et al., (2005) concluded that most insiders were motivated by financial
gain, and not a desire to cause harm to the organization. According to Randazzo et al.
(2005), 27% of the insiders studied were experiencing financial difficulties. They also
noted that “other motives included revenge, dissatisfaction with company management,
culture, or policies, and a desire for respect” (Randazzo et al., 2005, p. 14). Former
employees are familiar with organizational culture, policies, and procedures, which can
be exploited in an insider attack (Andersen et al., 2004). For this research study,
adversarial thinking was one of the indicator categorizations. Band et al. (2006) argued
that the “needs” of an individual often manifest as personal disposition in the workplace
and have been related to maladaptive reactions to stress, financial problems, and personal
needs, leading to personal conflicts, concealment of rule violations, chronic
disgruntlement, strong reaction to organizational sanctions, and a propensity for
escalation in work-related issues (p. 15). While Band et al. (2006), observed personal
predispositions were grouped into five categories: serious mental health disorders,
personality problems, social skills and decision-making biases, as well as, a history of
conflicts, these constructs are outside the scope of this study and will be incorporated into
future research. Furthermore, personal predispositions appeared to play a role in both
sabotage and espionage risks (Band et al., 2006).
Table 8
Literature Summary of Insiders as Adversaries and Cyber Adversarial Thinking
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Anderson et

Case study

six insider

Cybersecurity

Approach to
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al., 2004

threat cases

insider threat
detection

cybersecurity for
organizations
policies and
practices

Band et al.,
2006

Empirical
study

49 insider
threat
sabotage
cases

Cybersecurity
insider threat
sabotage
detection

Developed three
models that
describe the
relationships
between insider
threat sabotage and
espionage

Randazzo et
al., 2005

Aggregated
case-study
analysis

23 incidents
carried out by
26 insiders in
the financial
sector

Cybersecurity
insider threat
detection

Information
development of
commonalities
within the cases
studied

Insider Threat Cases Overview
According to Moore, Collins, Mundie, Ruefle, and Mcintire (2014), analysis of
insider threat cases regarding IT sabotage involved remote access outside of the insiders’
normal working hours. Moreover, analysis of insider threat cases show that 57% of insider
threat sabotage cases involved an attack within 60 days of the insider’s termination from
employment with the organization (Moore et al., 2014).
At the time of this study, one of the most recent high-profile insider threat cases
was that of Edward Snowden. Snowden, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
employee, and later a Booz Allen Hamilton federal government consultant, had held a
position that required a top secret security clearance (Kont, Pihelgas, Wojtkowiak,
Trinberg, & Osula, 2015). In June, 2013, Snowden spent several months working as a
high-level systems administrator before contacting Glenn Greenwald, a lawyer and
journalist, to disclose an unknown number of digital documents (Kont at al., 2015).
Snowden’s motivation for disclosure and security breach was his concern over how much
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personal data the National Security Agency (NSA) was collecting about ordinary
Americans, and he believed much more was being collected than was actually necessary
(Landau, 2013). The implications of Snowden’s disclosures of sensitive and classified
information were of great concern to not only the U.S. government, but also its allies
(Young, 2014).
Intelligence Community Standard (ICS) Number 500-27, Collecting and Sharing
of Audit Data, provides a comprehensive list of auditable events that “support lawful and
appropriate information assurance, business analytics, personnel security, and other
security community audit needs” (Committee on National Security Systems, 2013).
ICS Number 700-2, The Use of Audit Data for Insider Threat Detection, contains
information about the types of enterprise audit data that should be used as potential
indicators for individuals holding a Department of Defense (DoD) security clearance
(Guido & Brooks, 2013). This data can be analyzed in conjunction with other available
data in support of the detection, mitigation, or assessment of insider threats. Expanding
the amount and type of simulated data analyzed allowed for better insight into the
individuals and situations that may lead to insider threat activity.
Table 9
Literature Summary of Insider Threat Cases Overview
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Findings or
Contribution

Committee
on National
Security
Systems,
2013

Operational
guidance

NIST SPs
executive
orders, and
intelligence
community
standards

Information
systems
auditing

Annex of user / pc
auditable events
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Table 9
Literature Summary of Insider Threat Cases Overview (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Guido &
Brooks, 2013

Literature
review and
synthesis

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Findings
or Contribution

Various
organizations
with
successful
insider threat
programs

Cybersecurity
insider threat

Development of a
straw man insider
threat program
model

Kont et al.,
2015

Case study and
literature
review &
synthesis

Reviews of
existing
insider
research, and
case studies

Insider threat
detection and
mitigation

Technical and
nontechnical
indicators used in
the detection of
insider threats

Landau, 2013

Case study and
literature
review

Recent
insider threat
attack

Cybersecurity
insider threat

Complications
within U.S.
federal agencies
and information
disclosure

Moore et al.,
2014

Empirical
study

800 cases of
malicious
insider crime,
120 cases of
espionage

Enterprise
architecture
patterns

Presentation of
insider threat
mitigation
language

Young, 2014

Case study

Insider threat
attack

Cybersecurity
insider threat

Aftermath of
insider attack

Cybersecurity Indicators and Categories
The Committee on National Security System Instruction (CNSSI) has outlined the
minimum requirements for deploying the Enterprise Audit Management (EAM) as
required by ICS-500-27, these are as shown in Table 10 (Committee on National Security
Systems Instruction, 2013, p. B-1):
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Table 10
Auditable Attributable Events or Activities
Auditable Events (ICS-500-27)
Authentication Events

Logons (Success/Failure)
Logoffs (Success/Failure)

File and Object Events

Create (Success/Failure)
Access (Success/Failure)
Delete (Success/Failure)
Modify (Success/Failure)
Permission Modification (Success/Failure)
Ownership Modification (Success/Failure)

Writes/downloads to external
device/media (e.g., A-Drive,
CD/DVD, devices/printers)

(Success/Failure)

Uploads from external devices
(e.g., (CD/DVD drives)

(Success/Failure)

User and Group Management
events

User add, delete, modify, suspend, lock
(Success/Failure)
Group/Role add, delete, modify
(Success/Failure)

Use of Privileged/Special Rights
events

Security or audit policy changes
(Success/Failure)
Configuration changes (Success/Failure)

Admin or root-level access

(Success/Failure)

Privilege/Role escalation

(Success/Failure)

Audit and log data accesses

(Success/Failure)

System reboot, restart and
shutdown

(Success/Failure)

Print to a device

(Success/Failure)
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Table 10
Auditable Attributable Events or Activities (Cont.)
(Success/Failure)
Print to a file (e.g., pdf format)
Auditable Events (ICS-500-27)
Application (e.g., Firefox, IE, MS
Office, etc.) initialization

(Success/Failure)

Export of information (e.g., to
CDRW, thumb drives, or remote
systems)

(Success/Failure)

Import or information including
(e.g., to CDRW, thumb drives, or
remote systems)

(Success/Failure)

Auditable Event Details Information Events (Splunk, 2014, p. 5)
Date and time of the event using
common network time (Network
Time Protocol (NTP) Protocol)
Type of event (e.g., login, print,
etc.)
Identifier indicating the source
system of the event activity
Identifier indicating the identity of
the subject or actor (e.g., UserID,
ProcessID, etc.)
Details identifying any object or
resources accessed or involved (aka
Resource list, e.g., files (including
location), document ID,
peripherals, storage devices etc.)

(Success/Failure)

Attributable Events Indicating Violations of System/Target (events of concern
requiring further analysis or review.) (CNSS, 2013, p. B-2)
Malicious code detection
Unauthorized local device access
Unauthorized executable
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Table 10
Auditable Attributable Events or Activities (Cont.)
Attributable Events Indicating Violations of System/Target (events of concern
requiring further analysis or review.) (CNSS, 2013, p. B-2)
Unauthorized privileged access
System reset/reboot
Disabling the audit mechanism
Downloading to local devices
These requirements are a culmination of several federal directives, executive
orders, other standards, and NIST guidelines. These lists and guidelines are important as
they are recommended actions and operational guides to users, IT staff, security staff, and
others, when specific standards won’t apply (Harris, 2013). At the time of this study,
developments in cloud technologies have allowed employees and organizations to have
more flexibilities in how they work, allowing for working remotely to become more
accepted. That being said, the 2015 American Time Use Survey issued by the U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor, 2016),
showed that telecommuting is approximately 24% of employee’s telework with some
frequency. That being said, about 82% of employees are working within the
organizational boundary. This study focused on the activity of the majority of employees,
as noted by report above, that are behind the firewall and within the organizational
boundary.
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Table 11
Literature Summary of Cyber Threat Indicators and Categories
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Findings
or Contribution

Committee on
National
Security
Systems,
2013

Operational
guidance

NIST,
executive
orders, and
intelligence
community
standards

Information
systems
auditing

Annex of user /
pc auditable
events

Harris, 2013

Instructional

Industry
standards

Instruction for
CISSP
certification

Splunk, 2014

Situational
awareness

Industry
standards

ICS 700-2 and
indicators for
insider threat

U.S.
Department
of Labor,
2016

Operational
guidance

Industry
practices

How individuals
over 15 spent
their time

10,099
individuals
interviewed

Incident Response
Tondel, Line, and Jaatun (2014) explained that, based on International Standards
Organization (ISO) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
guidelines, an information security event can be described as an occurrence within a
system, service, or network state, that indicates a possible breach of security, outlined
policy, or failure of implemented controls, as well as, a previously unknown situation that
may be relevant to main security. As noted by Grispos, Bradley, and Storer (2015),
“researchers and industrial analysts contend that there are fundamental problems with the
existing security incident response process solutions” (p. 1). Ruefle et al. (2014)
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demonstrated that organized incident management involves organizationally defined,
repeatable processes with the ability to learn from the identified incidents that threaten
organizational computer systems and data. In most organizations, computer incidents are
managed by a computer security incident response team (CSIRT). Metzger, Hommel, and
Reiser (2011) reasoned that the CSIRT is enabled to correlate IT-related security events
across various communications channels and classify incidents in a consistent manner.
Therefore, depending on the incident classification, either manual or automated reaction
steps can be taken, either by an automated notification email to network and security
administrators, or a full segregation of a compromised system or network (Metzger et al.,
2011).
Recommendations by NIST researchers Cichonski, Millar, Grance, and Scarfone
(2012) outlined in their computer security incident handling guide four key phases in the
computer incident response cycle:
1. “Preparation
2. Detection and analysis
3. Containment/eradication
4. Recovery, and post-incident activity.” (p. 21)
As seen in Figure 2, the incident response phases relate to each other in a cyclical
manner, supplementing continuous monitoring and improvement. Further requirements as
outline by NIST include:
1. “Creating an incident response policy and plan
2. Developing procedures for performing incident handling reporting
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3. Setting guidelines for communicating with outside parties regarding
incidents
4. Selecting a team structure and staffing model
5. Establishing relationships and lines of communication between the
incident response team and other groups, both internal (e.g., legal
department) and external (e.g., law enforcement agencies)
6. Determining what services the incident response team should provide
7. Staffing and training the incident response team.” (Cichonski et al, 2012,
p. 21)

Preparation

Detection

Contain,
Eradicate,
Recover

PostIncident
Activity

Figure 2. Incident Response Life Cycle (Cichonski et al., 2012)
According to Grispos et al. (2011), in the event of an incident, the CSIRT gathers
forensic data from multiple sources, which can include logs, emails, hard drive images, and
physical memory dumps. Once specific tool designed to support information security
professionals, is known as intrusion detection system (IDS) (Werlinger, Muldner, Hawkey,
& Beznosov, 2010). The incident diagnostic process begins with a preparation phase,
which includes knowledge-gathering about vulnerabilities and risks through the use of
tools such as the IDS (Werlinger et al., 2010).

50
Table 12
Literature Summary of Incident Response
Study

Methodology

Cichonski et
al., 2012

Guidelines

Grispos, 2015

Literature
review and
empirical
study

Metzger et
al., 2011

Empirical
study

Ruefle et al.,
2014

Theoretical

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Findings or
Contribution

Computer
security
incident
response

Guidelines to
assist in
establishing
computer security
incident response
capabilities

15
individuals
surveyed in
semistructured
interviews

Cybersecurity
incident
response

Organizations can
benefit from an
alternative
approach to
incident handling
and managing
security incidents

Munich
scientific
network,
120,000
users, 80,000
devices

Cybersecurity
incident
response

Various reporting
capabilities can be
leveraged for
effective, efficient,
and integrated
incident response

Computer
security
incident
response team
(CSIRT)
development

Defined incident
response
management via
CSIRT ensure
focused incident
response efforts
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Table 12
Literature Summary of Incident Response (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Findings or
Contribution

Tondel et al.,
2014

Empirical
study

6 individuals
surveyed in
semistructured
interviews

Information
security
incident
response

Incident planning
and preparation
differ for IT and
industrial control
systems a unified
approach for
critical
infrastructure

Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS)
The IDPS is defined a software application that has the ability to monitor network
and system activities for unauthorized users and activities, as well as, alert organizational
personnel of such activities, including suspicious inbound and outbound traffic (Vaidya,
Mirza, & Mali, 2010). According to Scarfone and Mell (2007), “intrusion prevention is
the process of performing the process of intrusion detection and attempting to stop
possible incidents” (p. ES-1). Patrick (2001) illustrated how IDPS helps information
systems prepare for and deal with attacks, by noting that “this is accomplished by
collecting information from a variety of systems and network sources, and then analyzing
the information for possible security problems” (p. 3). Patrick (2001) further elaborated
on the benefits that IDPS provide, including: monitoring and analysis, auditing of
systems, configurations and vulnerabilities, system integrity, analysis of activity patterns
based on the matching to known attacks, abnormal activity analysis, and operating system
audits.
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One of the main points of this study was to identify abnormal or anomalous user
activity in an attempt to discover precursor activities to insider threat behavior.
According to Brown, Suckow, and Wang (2002), anomaly detection is concerned with
identifying events that appear to be anomalous with respect to normal user behavior on
the system. This research and proof-of-concept development aimed to identify anomalous
user behavior through linear and non-linear models of username and expert panel-defined
input indicators, through the analysis of input indicator associations or clustering.
Table 13
Literature Summary of Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
Study

Methodology

Broan et
al., 2002

Sample

Instrument of
Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Literature review
and analysis

Intrusion
detection
systems

Identified IDS
characteristics and
training
behavioral models

Patrick,
2001

Literature review
and analysis

Successful IDS Identified best
implementation practices to
successfully
implement an ISD
within an
organization

Scarfone &
Mell, 2007

Recommendations
and standards

Intrusion
detection and
prevention
systems

Recommendations
for designing,
implementing,
configuring,
securing,
monitoring, and
maintaining IDPS
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Table 13
Literature Summary of Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Li &
Datardina,
2010

Literature review

Sample

Instrument of
Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Intrusion
detection
systems

Provided
information on
intrusion
detection
approaches and
technologies

Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) Solutions
Cyber attacks have become increasingly more sophisticated, making traditional
log management and monitoring tools insufficient for the detection, prevention, and
mitigation of cyber attacks. This elicits a need for more efficient and effective event
intelligence, as well as, deeper analysis and understanding of environments with the use
of security information and event management (SIEM) platforms (Thakur, Kopecky,
Nuseir, Ali, & Qiu, 2016). One of the benefits of SIEM technology is its ability to
analyze security event data in real time, and its ability to collect, store, analyze, and
report on logged data for regulatory compliance along with forensics (Montesino, Fenz,
& Baluja, 2012, p. 249). Montesino, Fenz, and Baluja (2012) outlined the major functions
of the SIEM technologies:
Security information management (SIM): Log management and compliance
reporting. The SIM service provides the collection, reporting, and analysis of
various log source data, primarily from host systems and applications, and
secondarily from network and security devices in support of regulatory
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compliance reporting, threat management, and organizational resource monitoring
(Montesino et al., 2012, p. 253).
Security event management (SEM): Real-time monitoring and incident
management for security-related events. The SEM service processes logs and
event data from security devices, network devices, systems, as well as,
applications in real-time to security monitoring, activity correlation and incident
responses (Montesino et al., 2012, p. 253).
IDPS and SIEM tools merely scratch the surface in detecting cyber threats to an
organization’s infrastructure, simply because the number and sophistication of attacks
keep rising, making even the security tools themselves vulnerable to attacks (Thakur et
al., 2016).
Table 14
Literature Summary of Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) Solutions
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding
or Contribution

Montesino et
al., 2012

Empirical
study

NIST 800-53
and ISO.IEC
27001 security
controls

Cybersecurity
automation

Finds that 30%
of NIST 800-53
security controls
can be
automated

Thakur, 2016

Conceptual
study

HP ArcSight
SIEM
application

Security event
and log
management

Best practices in
enterprise
security
management

System Security Baseline Standards and Guidelines
Aim and Scope of a Security Policy
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According to Backhouse, Hsu, and Silva (2006), when considering information
systems security, “standards are fundamental compatibility specifications that shape the
configuration of information systems” (p. 413). The scope of a standard depends on the
immediate needs of the organization, and will specify a standard for installing, hardening,
and placing systems into production (Livingston, 2000). Livingston (2000) further
explained that a Minimum Security Baseline Standard (MSB) allows organizations to
deploy systems in more controlled, efficient, and standardized manner (p. 1). In IT and
security, the use of baselines has far-reaching effects, as they provide a measuring point
from which a comparative analysis can be derived, both before and after any changes or
incidents to a systems occurred (Fuller & Atlasis, 2012). NIST SP 800-53 (2013)
explained that one of the most significant challenges for organizations is in determining
the most cost-effective and appropriate set of security controls, which, if implemented
properly, would mitigate risk while helping to comply with federal laws, standards, and
other directives. To further expand on NIST SP 800-53 in order to assist organizations in
making the appropriate security control selection for their IT, the concept of “baseline
controls” was introduced (NIST, 2013). These controls act as a starting point for security
implementation, based on system criticality and associated risk, along with impact level.
In response to Presidential Executive Order 13636, “Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” NIST developed the Cybersecurity Framework (2014)
through a collaboration between the Federal Government and private industry, while it is
intended to complement an organization’s risk management and cybersecurity program
using common language in a cost-effective manner, without placing regulatory
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requirements on businesses (NIST, 2014). As outlined by AT&T Security (2015),
information security is not just a top executive or IT issue.
Table 15
Literature Summary of Aim and Scope of a Security Policy
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding
or Contribution

AT&T
Security, 2015

Conceptual
paper

Industry best
practices

Security must be
viewed with
many lenses

Backhouse et
al., 2006

Case study

Fuller &
Atlasis, 2012

Literature
review and
analysis

IT professional
competence

Specific
IT/cybersecurity
system
baselining
procedures

Livingston,
2000

Literature
review and
analysis

IT professional
competence

Specific
IT/cybersecurity
minimum
security
baselining
procedures

11 structured
Perceived
interviews with power
email follow
up

Theoretical
framework
revealing levels
of jurisdiction in
which actors
operate

Cybersecurity Monitoring
Insider Technical Event Indicators
Creasy and Glover (2015) of the Council of Registered Ethical Security Testers
(CREST), an international certification and accreditation body for the technical
information security industry, identified four types of technical event logs that can be
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useful for cybersecurity monitoring, and assist with the detection of potential
cybersecurity incidents (p. 18). Table 16 outlines the recommended log types and
examples for technical cybersecurity indicators. As noted by Verizon (2010), while it is
never a good thing to have large amounts of data leave a network at any given time, this
can indicate malicious activity. Looking for the correct indicators in the correct locations
can help mitigate a situation before it escalates into an event or a cyber-attack. By
applying different analytical techniques, cybersecurity analysts can validate the quality of
the information collected to identify indicators of actualized threats (Young, 2014).
Table 16
Technical Cybersecurity Indicators
Types of Logs

Examples
System activity logs (Administrator), including storage

System logs

Endpoint and agent based logs
Logs from standard and customized applications
Authentication logs
Physical security logs

Network logs

Email, firewall, VPN, and Netflow logs
HTTP proxy logs

Technical logs

DNS, DHCP, and FTP logs
Web and SQL logs
Appflow logs
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Table 16
Technical Cybersecurity Indicators (Cont.)
Types of Logs

Examples
Malware protection (anti-virus) logs

Logs from
cybersecurity
monitoring and logging
tools

Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) logs
Data loss protection (DLP) logs
Tools that employ potential malware isolation and
investigation (sandbox or virtual execution engines)
Other relevant security management appliances or tools.

According to Creasy and Glover (2015), event logs and tools should be
configured to enable event logging, use standard formats such as syslog, be parsed with
the necessary attributes (IP, user name, time & date, protocol, & port), and use a
consistent, trusted date and time source, such as Network Time Protocol (NTP) (p. 18).
Table 17
A Summary of Insider Technical Event Indicators
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Creasy &
Glover, 2015

Industry best
practices to
help capture
important
cybersecurity
events

Consumer
organizations,
government
bodies, and
academia

Cybersecurity
threat
identification

Details on how to
monitor and log
cybersecurity
events

Verizon, 2010

Cybersecurity
breach
investigation
and analysis

141confirmed
breaches

Cybersecurity
threat
identification

Identification of
preventive
measures divided
into categories
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Table 17
A Summary of Insider Technical Event Indicators (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Young, 2014

Case study

Insider threat
attack

Cybersecurity
threat
identification

Techniques to
validate threat
information

Insider Personality and Human-Centric Indicators
Greitzer et al. (2010) discussed several demographic, behavioral, or psychosocial
data, which, if used in various combinations, could provide warning signs of malicious
insider threats (p. 13). According to Barrick and Mount (1993), “it has long been argued
that the relationship between personality characteristics and behavior is moderated by the
strength (or demands) of the situation” (p. 112). They further explained this to mean that
the extent to which individuals’ personality characteristics predict behavior differs
“depending on the degree to which the external environment inhibits a person’s freedom
to behave in idiosyncratic ways” (p. 112). As noted by DeYoung (2015), researchers in
the psychology field often refer to “personality” as the “array of constructs that identify
variables in which individuals differ” (p. 33). In addition, personality refers to the
“specific mental organization and processes that produce an individual’s characteristic
patterns of behavior and experience” (DeYoung, 2015, p. 33). McAdams and Pals (2006)
explained that the mission of personality research is “to provide an integrative framework
for understanding the whole person” (p. 204). DeYoung (2015) described personality
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traits as “probabilistic descriptions of relatively stable patterns of emotion, motivation,
cognition, and behavior in response to classes of stimuli” (p. 35). In insider threat
research it is important to understand to the whole person because as noted by Greitzer et
al. (2014), “findings from research and case studies of insider crime suggests the
presence of personality predispositions in perpetrators” (p. 121).
The Five Factor Model of Personality
McCrae and Costa (2008) explained that the FFM of personality is the empirical
generalization about the covariance of personality traits (p. 159). Also referred to as the
Big Five, FFM “organizes broad individual differences in social and emotional life into
five factor-analytically-derived categories” (McAdams & Pals, 2006, p. 204). According
to Pytlik Zillig, Hemenover, and Dienstbier (2002), the FFM of personality: Openness,
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism (OCEAN), have emerged
from decades of research and are notable for their ability to simplify the vast number of
traits, and ability to predict certain outcomes (p. 847). According to McCrae and Costa
(1991), the FFM is comprehensive and provides a basis for a systemic study of
personality and affect (p. 227). Therefore, the FFM constructs and general descriptions
listed in Table 18, were used in this research study as indicators to determine the strength
of relationships between personality factors and malicious technical activity.
Table 18
Human-centric Indicators - Five Factor Model of Personality
Indicator

Description

Author(s)

Openness

Imaginative, artistically sensitive,
intellectual; creative, thoughtful

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge &
Bono, 2000
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Table 18
Human-centric Indicators - Five Factor Model of Personality (Cont.)
Indicator

Description

Author(s)

Conscientiousness

Responsible, dependable, persistent,
achievement oriented

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge &
Bono, 2000

Extraversion

Outgoing, active, sociable, talkative,
assertiveness

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge &
Bono, 2000

Agreeableness

Good-natured, cooperative, kind, gentle,
trusting

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge &
Bono, 2000

Tense, insecure, nervous; anxious, fearful,
depressed, moody

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge &
Bono, 2000

Neuroticism

As noted earlier, the FFM is a hierarchical model of personality traits
encompassing five factors representing personality at the broadest level, and is
considered the dominant approach for representing the human trait structure (Gosling,
Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002). As explained by
McAdams and Pals (2006), when “taken together, the five principles assert that
dispositional traits articulate broad variations in human functioning that are recognizable,
speaking directly to how human beings respond to situated social tasks” (p. 205).
In addition to the Human-centric psychometric indicators outlined, time working
at an organization has also been studied within the private and public sectors (Ramim &
Levy, 2006; Hoffman, Meyer, Schwarz, & Duncan, 1990). As noted by Mullen (1981),
the largest percentage of insider threat incidents, 38%, occurred during the six to 10-year
period of employment, this is followed by 27% in the three to five-year time period, with
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19% of insider threat incidents occurring within the first two years of employment.
Hoffman, Meyer, Schwarz, and Duncan (1990) determined that long term employment at
an organization does not guarantee that employees will not be tempted to malicious
activity. In their study, Hoffman et al., (1990) discovered that four out of the 62 insider
threat cases reviewed, had been at their place of employment for over 10 years.
Table 19
Literature Summary of Insider Personality and Human-Centric Indicators
Study

Methodology

Barrick &
Empirical
Mount, 1993 study

Sample
154
participants

DeYoung,
2015

Literature
review and
synthesis

Gosling et
al., 2003

Empirical
study

1704
undergrad
student
participants

Greitzer &
Ferryman,
2013

Empirical
study

Word analysis
representing
167 senders,
and 5.25
million words

Instrument
or Construct
Personality
scales from
several
personality
inventories
Cybernetics
and FFM in
goal directed
systems
External
correlates of a
new Ten Item
Personality
Inventory
(TIPI)
Insider threat
mitigation

Main Findings or
Contribution
Mean, standard
deviations,
reliabilities,
correlations for job
level measures
Introduction of
Cybernetic Big-Five
theory
Introduction of
TIPI as a short
measure for FFM
psychometrics
Analytic
approaches and
metrics in
evaluating tools to
identify insider
threats

Table 19
Literature Summary of Insider Personality and Human-Centric Indicators (Cont.)
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Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Findings or
Contribution

Greitzer et
al., 2010

Empirical
study

10 staff
members
recommended
by HR,
reviewed 24
insider threat
cases

Insider threat
prediction

Validation using
twelve indicators
and a good model,
insider threat risk
can be correlated
with HR
judgements

Hoffman et
al., 1990

Empirical
study

62 insider
threat cases

Insider threat
prediction

Impact of insiders
working with
outsiders to bring
harm to nuclear
facilities.

Judge &
Bone, 2000

Empirical
study

316
participants
enrolled in a
community
program

Linking FFM to Agreeableness as
transformational strong predictor of
leadership
leadership
behavior

McAdams
& Pals,
2006

Literature
review and
synthesis

McCrae &
Costa, 1991

Empirical
study

McCrae &
Costa, 2008

Theoretical

FFM, individual Principles for
traits and
integrating the
characteristics
science of
personality
429
participants in
a longitudinal
study

FFM and
wellbeing

Effects of
personality on
psychological
wellbeing

FFM and Trait
Theory

Dimensions of
FFM personality
traits and human
nature
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Table 19
Literature Summary of Insider Personality and Human-Centric Indicators (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Lytlik Zillig Literature
et al., 2002 review and
synthesis

Instrument
or Construct

Main Findings or
Contribution

Personality
inventory
samples

New perspectives
on FFM and the
nature of
personality traits

Ramim &
Levy, 2006

Case study

Small
university
setting

Insider cyber
attack

Insider cyber
attack was
successful do to
novice IT
management and
lack of policies
and governance

Mullen,
1981

Empirical
study

650 articles,
studies, and
books

Insider threat
characteristics

Provided a set of
insider threat
characteristics and
potential threats to
nuclear facilities

Roccas et
al., 2002

Empirical
study

246
introductory
psychology
students

FFM and
personal values

Relating FFM and
basic personal
values

Delphi Technique
According to Straub (1989), content validity is established by literature reviews, a
pretest phase, and use of expert panels. Lichvar (2011), noted that an expert is a specialist
in his or her particular field or domain. Furthermore, as explained by Sekaran and Bougie
(2013), an expert panel can verify that the measures being employed truly include “an
adequate and representative set of items that tap the concept” (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013,
p. 226). Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) indicated that when judgmental information is
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essential, researchers should employ the Delphi technique. The Delphi technique
“involves the repeated individual questioning of the experts (by interview or
questionnaire) and avoids direct confrontation of the experts with one another” (Dalkey
& Helmer, 1963, p. 458). Linstone and Turnoff (2002) characterized the Delphi technique
as “a method for structuring a group communication process so that the process is
effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem”
(p. 3). Prior research, e.g. Ramim and Lichvar (2014), Tracey and Richey (2007), as well
as Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, and Cule (2001) applied the Delphi technique for issue
identification, model forecasting, and the development of the conceptual framework.
According to Schmidt et al. (2001), the Delphi technique ensures “a reliable and
validated data collection process” (p. 10) by compiling often contradictory opinions,
while pursuing a consolidation of the experts’ responses. This research study identified
the expert opinions of malicious cybersecurity insider threat indicators through the use of
the Delphi technique.
Table 20
Literature Summary of Delphi Technique
Study

Methodology

Dalkey &
Theoretical
Helmer, 1963

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Delphi
techniques
and
application

Determined
Delphi is
conductive in
producing
insights into the
subject matter
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Table 20
Literature Summary of Delphi Technique (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Lichvar,
2011

Empirical
study

256
respondents

7-part survey
instrument

Validate the
effects of
knowledge
sharing

Linstone &
Turnoff,
(2002)

Theoretical

Delphi
techniques
and
application

Delphi method
for group
communication
process

Okoli &
Pawlowski,
(2004)

Theoretical

Delphi
techniques
and
application

Uses of the
Delphi technique
for theory
building

Ramim &
Lichavar,
2014

Theoretical

Delphi
techniques
and
application

Uses of Delphi
technique in
project
management

Schmidt et
al., (2001)

Empirical
study

Delphi survey

Improving risk
management
practices

Straub,
(1989)

Theoretical

Instrument
validation

Overview of the
basic principles of
instrument
validation

Tracey &
Richey,
(2007)

Empirical
study

Model
construction
and validation

Decision-making
processes and
procedures in
model
development

6616
respondents
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Data Mining
Data mining enables researchers to find information that was not expected to be
revealed in databases (Clifton & Marks, 1996). According to Hearst (1999), “the goal of
data mining is to discover or derive new information from data, finding patterns across
datasets, and/or separating signal from noise” (p. 3). Additionally, data mining is often
referred to as “knowledge discovery” in databases, meaning “the process of nontrivial
extraction of implicit, unknown, and potentially useful information from data” (Chen,
Han, & Yu, 1996, p. 1041). Chen et al. (1996) elaborated on data mining, in that
discovered knowledge can be applied to inform management and assist in the decision
making process, as well as, many other applications. An objective of data mining, or data
exploration, is to find correlations in the data and uncover hidden patterns within the data
distribution to provide more insight into the data (Reddy & Aziz, 2010).
Table 21
Literature Summary of Data Mining
Study

Methodology

Chen et al.,
1996

Clifton &
Marks, 1996

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Literature
review and
analysis

Cybersecurity
and Privacy
issues in
critical
infrastructure

Methodology for
data analysis and
research on
vulnerabilities in
smart grid and
critical
infrastructure

Theoretical

Data mining
techniques to
summarize
data

The use of public
and sensitive
information in
search of
inference paths
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Table 21
Literature Summary of Data Mining (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Hearst, 1999

Theoretical

Reddy &
Aziz, 2009

Theoretical

Sample

Several realworld
datasets

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Data mining
for text
exploration

Text
exploration
strategies

Nonlinear data Method for
correlations
computing
subspace
principal curve
models

Pattern Recognition
As explained by Raj, Swaminarayan, Saini, and Parmar (2015), “a pattern can
have a perceptual feature, a way of operation or behavior, something regarded as a
normative example, or a model considered worthy of imitation” (p. 2496). According to
Bishop (2006), pattern recognition pertains to “the automatic discovery of regularities in
data through the use of computer algorithms, and with the use of these regularities to take
action, such as classifying the data into different categories” (p. 1). The concept behind
pattern recognition is to assign labels to objects, allowing a set of measurements, also
called attributes or features, to describe the object (Kuncheva, 2004). Jain, Duin, and
Mao (2000) explained that pattern recognition pertains to both supervised and
unsupervised classification.
When considering the “unsupervised” category, which is also called unsupervised
learning, the interest is in discovering any structure in the data, such as groups, or any
shared characteristics, making the objects similar or different across the groups
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(Kuncheva, 2004). According to Sathya and Abraham (2013), “unsupervised” refers to
the ability to learn and organize information without providing an error signal to evaluate
the potential solution” (p. 3). One advantage of unsupervised learning is that the lack of
direction in the learning algorithm allows researchers to look backwards for patterns that
may have not previously been considered (Kohonen, Oja, Simula, Visa, & Kangas,
1996).
Another consideration in pattern recognition is the “supervised” category, also
called supervised learning. In supervised learning, each object in the data set has a
preassigned class label. The task here is to “train a classifier to do the labeling sensibly;
we supply the machine with learning skills and present the labeled data to it” (Kuncheva,
2004, p. 3). Supervised learning is efficient in that it is based on training a data sample
from a data source with the correct classification already assigned; helping to find
solutions to “several linear and non-linear problems such as classification, control,
forecasting, and prediction” (Sathya & Abraham, 2013, p. 34).
Table 22
Literature Summary of Pattern Recognition
Study

Methodology

Bishop, 2006

Theoretical

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Pattern
recognition

Overview of
linear models
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Table 22
Literature Summary of Pattern Recognition (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Jain, 2000

Kohonen et
al., 1996

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Theoretical

Statistical
pattern
recognition

Overview of
supervised and
unsupervised
classification

Literature
review

Data
visualization

Introduced selforganizing map
as a tool for data
visualization

Kuncheva,
2004

Theoretical

Pattern
recognition

Overview of the
pattern
recognition cycle

Raj, 2015

Literature
review

Pattern
recognition
algorithms

Pattern
recognition
algorithms can
be applied in the
agricultural
domain
Presented a
conceptual
framework of
pattern
classification in
the education
industry

Sathaya,
2013

Empirical
study

Dataset with
300 students

Unsupervised
and
supervised
machine
learning
models

Trend Analysis
According to Alexandrov, Bianconcini, Dagum, Maass, and McElroy (2012),
there is often a need to determine if a trend exists within a given time series. This is
referred to as trend detection and is typically solved through the use of statistical tests,
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which often require the use of trend models (Alexandrov et al., 2012). As explained by
Kivikunnas (1993), trends have meaning to human experts, and are patterned or
structured in one-dimensional data (p. 1).
Trend analysis builds an integrated model using the following four major
components or movements to characterize time-series data:
1. Trend or long-term movements: These indicate the general direction in
which a time-series graph is moving over time.
2. Cyclical movements: These are long-term oscillations about a trend line or
curve.
3. Seasonal variations: These are nearly identical patterns that a time series
appears to follow during corresponding seasons of successive years.
4. Random movements: These characterize sporadic changes due to chance
events (Han, Kamber, & Pei, 2012).
Trend analysis assists in providing context and value to either stored or real-time
data. As noted by Streibel (2008), the more meaningful the stored information, the more
powerful the knowledge retrieved becomes. This research study utilized pattern
recognition and trend analysis techniques to identify correlations between user activity
and precursors to malicious cybersecurity insider threat attacks.
Table 23
Literature Summary of Trend Analysis
Study

Methodology

Alexandrov
et al., 2012

Literature
review

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Trend
extraction

Approaches to
trend extraction
for time series
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Table 23
Literature Summary of Trend Analysis
Study

Methodology

Han et al.,
2012

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Conceptual
instruction

Data mining

Presented data
mining techniques
and algorithms

Kivikunnas,
1993

Literature
review

Trend analysis

Identified trend
analysis methods
and applications

Streibel,
2008

Conceptual
instruction

Data mining
text

Presented data
mining by
analyzing text
streams

Data Modeling and Simulation
By definition, “a data model is a conceptual representation of the data structures
that are required by a data” (Mamcenko, 2004, p. 5). According to Navathe (1992), “a
data model is a set of concepts that can be used to describe the structure of and operations
on a database, meaning, data types, relationships, and other constraints within the
database” (p. 113). In their seminal work, Greitzer and Frinke (2010) proposed that
research should focus on: combining traditionally monitored information security data
(e.g. workstation & Internet activity) with other kinds of organizational and social data to
infer the motivations of individuals and predict the actions that they are undertaking,
which may allow early identification of high-risk individuals (p. 2).
According to Riley (2010), one of the ways that data modeling can assist in the
development of cybersecurity tools, such as the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype,
uses existing computational capability to test continually security assumptions on existing
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systems (p. 6). Furthermore, when dealing with cybersecurity tool development, the use
of simulations or virtual machines provides a well-defined testing environment to
explore, in a controlled manner, the behavior of computational and security systems in
the presence of well-defined attacks (Riley, 2010, p. 6). In the work of Yan, Chen,
Eidenbenz, and Li (2007), a simulation was used to study trace-oriented malware
propagation using real world data.
Table 24
Literature Summary of Data Modeling and Simulation
Study

Methodology

Mamcenko,
2004

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding
or Contribution

Presentation of
database
management
technology

IT
professional
competence

Specific IT
database
management
skills

Myers et al.,
2009

Literature
review and
synthesis

Intrusion
detection
system and
algorithm,
heuristics, and
signatures

Best practices
correlated with
IDS algorithms
for detecting
malicious
activity

Navathe,
1992

Literature
review and
synthesis

IT
professional
competence
and database
management
systems
(DBMS)

Proposed the
classification of
data models and
identified
specific features

Riley, 2010

Case study and Guidance
game theory
from other
sciences

IT and
cybersecurity
professional
competence

Several subfields of
computer
science that are
relevant in
cybersecurity
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Table 24
Literature Summary of Data Modeling and Simulation (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct

Main Finding
or Contribution

Yan et al.,
2007

Empirical
research

Dataset of
65,770 social
media users

Trace driven
simulation to
study malware
propagation

Trace driven
simulation to
study the impact
of initial
infection, user
click probability,
and user activity
patterns on
malware in
social networks

Cross-Validation, the Bootstrap, and the Jackknife
According to Efron and Gong (1983), “cross-validation is a way of obtaining nearly
unbiased estimators of prediction error in complicated situations” (p. 37). As explained by
Efron and Gong (1983), the method consists of a four-step computational process which
consists of:
“(a) deleting the points xi from the data set one at a time;
(b) recalculating the prediction rule on the basis of the remaining n – 1points;
(c) seeing how well the recalculated rule predicts the deleted point; and
(d) averaging these predictions over all n deletions of an xi.” ( p. 37)
The major advantage of cross-validation is that is can be applied arbitrarily to
complicated prediction rules (Efron & Gong, 1983).
As noted by Efron, Halloran, and Holmes (1996), the bootstrap “is a computerbased technique for assessing the accuracy of almost any statistical estimate” (p. 13429-
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13434). Orloff and Bloom (2014) further explained that the bootstrap would not be
possible without current-day computing power, where the “key is to perform computation
on the data itself to estimate the variation of statistics that are themselves computed from
the same data” (p. 1). Additionally, according to Kleijnen and Deflandre (2005),
“bootstrapping implies resampling with replacements of a given sample” (p. 123).
Furthermore, bootstrapping is considered a fast analytical technique which requires an
extremely short period of time to derive statistical conclusions (Kleijnen & Deflandre,
2005).
Equally important, the jackknife is a “technique for reducing the bias of a serial
correlation estimator based on splitting the sample into two half-samples” (Miller, 1974)
(p. 1). According to Efron (1979), “the jackknife is a nonparametric method for
estimating the bias and variance of a statistic of interest, and also for testing the null
hypothesis that the distribution of a statistic is centered on some pre-specified point” (p.
1). Efron and Gong (1983) illustrated that, similarly to the bootstrap, “the jackknife can
be applied to any statistic that is a function of n independent and identically distributed
variables” (p. 39). According to Stone (1974), jackknifing is differentiated crossvalidation in that jackknifing “manufactures pseudovalues for the reduction of bias” (p.
112). However, it has been noted by Gong (1986) that, in comparing the performance of
all three methods, cross-validation and jackknifing do not seem to offer any significant
improvements over the apparent error rate, “whereas the improvement given by the
bootstrap is substantial” (p. 108).
Table 25
Literature Summary of Cross-Validation, the Bootstrap, and the Jackknife
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Study

Methodology

Efron, 1979

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Theoretical

Jackknife as a
linear
expansion
method

Jackknife and
bootstrap
methods for
estimating the
variance the
sample

Efron & Gong,
1983

Theoretical

Parametric
analysis

Expository
review of
nonparametric
estimation of
statistical error

Efron et al.,
1996

Theoretical

Statistical
inference

As few as 50 or
100 bootstrap
replications can
give useful
estimates.

Gong, 1986

Empirical
study

Kleijnen &
Deflandre,
2005

Experimental
design

Monte Carlo
simulations

Identified that
bootstrapping
validation
statistics yielded
distribution free
confident
intervals

Miller, 1974

Theoretical

Multi-sample
jackknives

Two jackknife
methods tested
prove to be
equally valid
asymptotically

Simulations
and real data

CrossComparison of
validation and
cross-validation,
prediction rules jackknife, and
bootstrap, show
substantial gains
and improvement
in prediction.
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Table 25
Literature Summary of Cross-Validation, the Bootstrap, and the Jackknife (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Orloff &
Bloom, 2014

Stone, 1974

Sample

Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Conceptual
paper

Empirical
bootstrap
methods

Outlined a set of
competencies
useful in
statistical testing
methods

Theoretical

General
framework

Illustrated the
application of a
cross-validation
criterion to the
choice and
assessment of
statistical
predictions

78
A Summary of What was Known and Unknown in Research Literature
A review of the literature was performed to provide an overview of the various
aspects of cybersecurity, technical and human centric indicators, data simulations, and
insider threats. Through this literature review, various indicators and identification
models for the insider threat problem were determined, leading to the discovery of what
was known and unknown in insider threat precursor identification at the time of this
study. The literature has shown that, in many insider threat attacks, managers and other
co-workers had observed that the individual committing the insider threat attack had
exhibited signs of stress as well as disgruntlement, or other observable, unfavorable
behavior, yet no one raised an alarm (Greitzer et al., 2012). These psychosocial or
behavioral indicators that might be observed before an insider commits an attack can be
leveraged to assist in the identification of precursors to malicious cybersecurity insider
threat attack.
In the work of Greitzer et al. (2010), a model focusing on behavioral observables
that could be recorded and audited was developed, helping in “making inferences about
the possible psychological/personality/social state of employee” (p. 4.9). For the purposes
of this study, these psychosocial indicators were not only be correlated with technical
indicators and simulated user activity, but also weighted and validated by industry
experts. A tool that can aggregate, in real-time, these psychosocial indicators, and
correlate them with technical indicators, as well as user network activity, appeared to be
absent from the literature. Thus, this study designed, developed, and empirically tested a
tool that will correlate weighted and validated psychosocial behaviors/indicators with
technical indicators that include network activity.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Overview of Research Design
This study was a developmental research study. As outlined by Ellis and Levy
(2009) developmental research aims at answering how the construction of a “thing,” or an
artifact, will address a given problem. Klein (2014) explained that design and
development research is “a type of inquiry unique to the instructional design and
technology field dedicated to the creation of new knowledge and the validation of
existing practice” (p. 1). Ellis and Levy (2009) summarized developmental research as
comprising three major elements: 1) that the product criteria must be established and
validated, 2) that the product development follows formalized and accepted processes,
and 3) validation of the product criteria is met through formalized, accepted processes.
Tracey and Richey (2007) used a systematic process to develop an instructional
design model that was validated using the Delphi technique, where a panel of experts
both analyzed and offered feedback on the researchers’ proposed design. Once the initial
model was constructed, it was then reviewed and validated by industry experts through a
multi-round Delphi technique (Tracey, 2009).
To meet the specific goals that address the main research question, this study
conducted three phases of research as shown in Figure 3. In Phase 1, Delphi 1 and Delphi
2 were performed using instances of the Delphi technique, where SMEs validate
indicators and indicator categories as well as assign indicator weights and correlations.
Phase 2 of this research study consisted of in depth data analysis of the simulated
employee activity data set to determine false positives and negatives, as well as, identify
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significant indicators to identify insider threat activity. Phase 3 of this research study
analyzed the evidence collected, and detected the accuracy of the proof-of-concept
prototype predicted malicious events.

Figure 3. Proposed Overview of the Research Design Process
Instrument Development
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Greitzer et al. (2014) recognized the lack of research involving malicious
cybersecurity insider threat development of behavioral indicators, as well as, the need for
the development of methods to assess the associated insider threat risks (p. 107).
Moreover, Greitzer et al. (2010) cautioned, “Predictive approaches cannot be validated a
priori; false accusations may harm the career of the accused; and collection/monitoring of
certain types of data may adversely affect the employee morale” (p. 1100).
Claycomb et al. (2013) elucidated, when observing human behavior, often only
two types of activities are considered: behavioral (i.e., interpersonal human-to-human),
and technical (i.e., human interactions with IT). This leaves room for researchers to
identify the correlations between both types of behaviors. Greitzer and Hohimer (2011)
reiterated, “defining triggers in terms of observable cyber and psychosocial indicators and
higher-level aggregated patterns of these behaviors is a major challenge, but also a
critical ingredient of a predictive methodology” (p. 43). Early and Stott III (2015) argued
the need to identify intelligently, as well as, autonomously, in addition to pinpointing
innocuous or unnoticed security event attributes to allow security personnel to remediate
preemptively physical, as well as, informational, risks before a security event occurs (p.
1). The White House (2010) issued the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum
Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, and one of its main objectives
is described as:
General Responsibilities of Departments and Agencies: #2. “Establish an
integrated capability to monitor and audit information for insider threat detection
and mitigation. Critical program requirements include but are not limited to: (1)
monitoring user activity on classified computer networks controlled by the
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Federal Government; (2) evaluation of personnel security information; (3)
employee awareness training of the insider threat and employees’ reporting
responsibilities; and (4) gathering information for a centralized analysis, reporting
and response capability.” (The White House, 2010, p. 2)
Many insider threat programs in both the Federal Government and in the private
sector focus on technological tools that monitor network traffic and online activity,
paying attention only to specific individuals who exhibit suspicious behavior (INSA,
2013). The ease in which end-users are able to transition from personal online accounts to
professional networks exacerbates the need to ensure such measures are not tied to
malicious cybersecurity insider threat activity.
This study evaluated simulated user activity against a set of indicators which were
identified from previously validated research (Oceja, Ambrona, Lopez-Perez, Salgado, &
Villegas, 2010). This identified set of both technical and psychometric indicators was
then validated by the Delphi technique expert panel selection, with a Web-based survey
tool as provided in Appendices C and D. Indicators and indicator groupings validated in
the first round then go through a second round of Delphi technique for the expert panel
weight assignment of the indicators and expert validated correlations. Once the expert
panel validated, grouped, correlated, and assigned weights to the indicators, the final list
of indicators was applied to the proof-of-concept prototype, and initial testing began.
Table 26 outlines the indicator categories and descriptions that were presented to SMEs
through the online survey tool.
SME Data Collection
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For Phase 1, this study was conducted using the Delphi technique to collect data
from the expert panel. The expert panel consisted of SMEs that are experts in the field of
cybersecurity monitoring and response. According to Skulmoski, Hartman, and Krahn
(2007), the Delphi technique expert panel can range anywhere from 11 to 345
participants. Skinner, Nelson, Chin, and Land (2015) noted that typical expert panel sizes
range anywhere from 10 to 30 SMEs. This research study intended to select 30 SMEs for
the expert panel and attempted to have the same SMEs participate in both Delphi 1 and
Delphi 2 during Phase 1. This research study accepted cybersecurity certifications and
academic degrees as credentials for expert panelists, and intended to solicit the expert
advice of SMEs from industry, academia, and the federal government for each iteration
of the survey and subsequent rounds if necessary. SMEs that possessed the required
credentials were contacted through either direct email or the use of LinkedIn social media
Website. SMEs recommended by the Dissertation committee, who possess the required
credentials were also accepted. The SMEs expert opinion was collected, as well as, the
SMEs demographic information identifying gender, age group, education level, role
within the organization, and industry worked in.
Phase 1 – Expert Panel Elicitation
To establish Phase 1, an Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval letter was
obtained, as seen in Appendix A. Therefore, Phase 1 of this developmental research
elicited industry experts’ opinions using the Delphi technique to identify technical and
psychometric cybersecurity indicators for measuring malicious cybersecurity insider
threat activity (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). As seen in Figure 3, Phase 1 consisted of two
iterations of the Delphi technique, namely, Delphi 1 and Delphi 2, with each Delphi
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iteration consisting of multiple rounds. Quantitative and qualitative data for Phase 1 were
collected using SurveyMonkey electronic surveys to gather the expert opinions of 30
SMEs.
During Phase 1, Step 1, the SMEs were emailed the Delphi 1, SurveyMonkey
electronic survey seen in Appendix C. For each survey item/indicator, the SMEs were
asked to rank the survey item/indicator’s order of importance for the detection of
malicious cybersecurity insider threat attack; using a seven-point Likert scale ranging
from (1) “not at all important” to (7) as “extremely important”. Once the SMEs
consensus was achieved, meaning all the SME’s were in agreement, in regard to the SME
validated cybersecurity indicators, from all proposed important cybersecurity indicators,
the first specific goal was met and RQ1 was addressed.
For Phase 1, Step 2, using the same SurveyMonkey electronic survey, the SMEs
were presented with cybersecurity indicator categories as seen in Table 26, and asked to
rate the cybersecurity indicator categories by the cybersecurity indicator categories
importance in detecting insider threats; this was accomplished using a seven-point Likert
scale ranging from (1) “not at all important” to (7) as “extremely important”. Once the
SMEs consensus was achieved in regard to the cybersecurity indicator categories, the
second specific goal was met and RQ2 was addressed. Table 26 outlines the proposed
technical and psychometric indicators and indicator categories of the Phase 1, Delphi 1
tentative survey instrument which require SME’s input for validation.
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Table 26
Indicators Used in Phase 1 Tentative Survey Instrument
Indicator Category

Indicator Description
Number

Author(s)

Technical:
Unauthorized Logon
Activity

LG1

Employee logs on to different PC’s
without proper authorization

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

LG2

Employee logs on after-hours without
proper authorization

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

LG3

Employee logs on after-hours more
than 30% of the time (9 out or 30
days) without proper authorization

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

MC1

Employee connects a removable
media device to an organizational PC

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

MC2

Employee disconnects a removable
media device from an organizational
PC

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

MC3

Employee disconnects a removable
media device after a PC shutdown

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

MC4

Employee uses (connect/disconnect)
a removable media device more than
3 times in one day

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

MF1

Employee opens a file from a
removable media device on an
organizational PC

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

Technical:
Removable Media
Device Connection
Activity

Technical:
Removable Media
Device Connection
Activity

Technical:
Removable Media
Device File Activity
(Open, Write, Copy,
Delete) Activity
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Table 26
Indicators Used in Phase 1 Tentative Survey Instrument (Cont.)
Indicator Category

Indicator Description
Number

Author(s)

Technical:
Removable Media
Device File Activity
(Open, Write, Copy,
Delete) Activity

MF2

Employee writes a file to a removable
media device

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

MF3

Employee copies a file to a
removable media device

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

MF4

Employee copies a file more than 3
times in one day to a removable
media device

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

MF5

Employee deletes a file from a
removable media device

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

HT1

Employee visits an external HTTP
site

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

HT2

Employee uploads a file to an
external HTTP site

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

HT3

Employee uploads a file to an
external HTTP site more than 3 times
in one day

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

HT4

Employee downloads a file from an
external HTTP site

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

HT5

Employee downloads a file from an
external HTTP site more than 3 times
in one day

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

HT6

Employee visits an eternal HTTP site
with risky words identified in the
organizational word content filtering
technology

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

EM1

Employee sends an email with an
attachment to an external domain

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

EM2

Employee sends more than 5 emails
with an attachment to an external
domain

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

Technical:
HTTP/Online Activity

Technical:
Email Activity
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Table 26
Indicators Used in Phase 1 Tentative Survey Instrument (Cont.)
Indicator Category

Technical:
Unauthorized File
(Decoy/Honeypot)
Access

Psychometric:
Openness

Indicator Description
Number

Author(s)

EM3

Employee receives an email with an
attachment from an external domain

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

EM4

Employee receives more than 5
emails with an attachment, from an
external domain in one day

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

EM5

Employee sends an internal email
with risky words identified in the
organizational word content filtering
technology

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

EM6

Employee receives an internal email
with risky words identified in the
organizational word content filtering
technology

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

EM7

Employee receives an external email
with risky word identified in the
organizational word content filtering
technology

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

EM8

Employee sends an external email
with risky words identified in the
organizational word content filtering
technology

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

DF1

Employee accesses a decoy file or
honeypot without proper
authorization

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

DF2

A PC accesses a decoy file or
honeypot without proper
authorization

Creasy & Glover,
2015; Verizon, 2010

PS1

Openness - Personality Traits:
Imagination, feelings, actions, ideas

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

PS1A

Low score on Openness: The
employee practical conventional,
prefers routine, pragmatic, data driven

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000
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Table 26
Indicators Used in Phase 1 Tentative Survey Instrument (Cont.)
Indicator Category

Indicator Description
Number

Author(s)

PS1B

High Score on Openness: The
employee is curious, independent,
creative, receptive

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

Psychometric:
Conscientiousness

PS2

Conscientiousness – Personality
Traits: Competence, self-discipline,
thoughtfulness, goal driven

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

Psychometric:
Conscientiousness

PS2A

Low score on conscientiousness: The
employee is impulsive, careless,
disorganized

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

Psychometric:
Conscientiousness

PS2B

High score on conscientiousness: The
employee is persistent, driven,
hardworking, dependable, organized

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

Psychometric:
Extroversion

PS3

Extroversion – Personality Traits:
Sociability, assertiveness, emotional
expression

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

PS3A

Low score on Extroversion: The
employee is quiet, reserved,
withdrawn, reflective

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

PS3B

High score on Extroversion: The
employee is outgoing, warm, seeks
adventure

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

PS3

Extroversion – Personality Traits:
Sociability, assertiveness, emotional
expression

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

PS3A

Low score on Extroversion: The
employee is quiet, reserved,
withdrawn, reflective

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

PS3B

High score on Extroversion: The
employee is outgoing, warm, seeks
adventure

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

Psychometric:
Extroversion
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Table 26
Indicators Used in Phase 1 Tentative Survey Instrument (Cont.)
Indicator Category

Indicator Description
Number

Author(s)

Psychometric:
Agreeableness

PS4

Agreeableness - Personality Traits:
The employee is cooperative,
trustworthy, good-natured

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

PS4A

Low score on Agreeableness: The
employee is critical, uncooperative,
suspicious, competitive, challenging

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

PS4B

High score on Agreeableness: The
employee is helpful, trusting,
empathetic, cooperative

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

PS5

Neuroticism – Personality Traits: The
employee has a tendency towards
negative emotions

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

PS5A

Low score on Neuroticism: The
employee is calm, even-tempered,
secure

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

PS5B

High score on Neuroticism: The
employee is anxious, unhappy, prone
to negative emotions

Barrick & Mount,
2010; Judge & Bono,
2000

Psychometric:
Neuroticism

Once Phase 1, Steps 1 and 2 were completed, processing of the data collected
occurred, identifying the SME selected top 10 cybersecurity indicators and indicator
categories. During Phase 1, Step 3, the SMEs were emailed the Delphi 2, SurveyMonkey
electronic survey as seen in Appendix D, prepopulated with data collected during Phase
1, Steps 1 and 2. Using the Delphi 2 electronic survey, the SMEs were asked to assign
weights to the top 10 cybersecurity indicators, using a sliding scale from 1 to 100. When
the SMEs reached a consensus on the validated indicator weights, the third specific goal
was met and RQ3 was addressed.
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Figure 4: Proposed Indicator Correlation Matrix
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Phase 1, Step 4, asked the SMEs to identify the most significant indicator
relationships using Figure 4 and a series of dropdown menus as seen in Appendix D.
When a consensus was reached for the SME identified significant relationships between
indicators, the fourth specific goal was met and RQ4 was addressed.
An analysis of the SMEs opinions was performed to identify the SME agreed
upon responses for Phase 1, for the purposes of this research study a consensus was
achieved when 70% of expert panel were in agreement, as recommended by Sumsion
(1998). When the Delphi technique is used, each round of each phase builds on the
previously administered survey instrument, until a consensus of SMEs opinions is
achieved. The SurveyMonkey electronic surveys were administered to SMEs from
academia, government, and industry, for each Delphi iteration and subsequent rounds if
necessary.
Due to the nature of the Delphi method building on the previous round and
iteration, the SurveyMonkey survey instruments for Delphi 1 and Delphi 2, were subject
to change based on the SMEs recommendations and opinions. This study attempted to
gather expert opinion from the same SMEs for the duration of the data collection. When a
consensus was achieved for all SME identified indicator validation, indicator categories,
indicators weights and indicator correlations, the specific goals and RQs addressed, Phase
1 was complete and the study initiated Phase 2.
Phase 2 – Proof-of-Concept Prototype Development
Phase 2, Step 1, of this research study exercised the aforementioned developed
and validated technical, as well as, psychometric indicators into the AI-InCyThR proofof-concept prototype that was used to collect the simulated user activity data.
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Additionally, the simulated data were refined to include the identification of false
positives and negatives, together with measure indicators.
As previously mentioned, a Minimum Security Baseline (MSB) allows
organizations to deploy systems in a more controlled, efficient, and standardized manner
(Livingston, 2000). Fuller and Atlasis (2012) explained that:
“In general, a baseline is a well-defined, well-documented version of the solution
at some point in its life cycle, and is used as a foundation to support other
activities, including measurement.” (p. 2)
From a technical perspective, Santos (2007) identified that the “initial learning mode and
anomaly detection within Cisco IDS/IPS devices is performed over a period of 24 hours
by default” (p. 137). However, as noted by Spears and Barki (2010), “in the context of
compliance, a control must be implemented for two months (60 days) before its
performance can be audited” (p. 515).
The thresholds outlined were representative of an organizational security policy
which would capture a baseline as the first 60 days of an employee’s activity. Activity
that significantly differentiates from the organizational established baselines are flagged
and categorized as a potential policy violation. Grouping several violations per user will
rate the user as having a higher tendency towards malicious activity. Per each behavior,
two time periods were established, (1) the baseline time period (normal behavior, i.e. 60
days), and (2) the at-risk time period or period of interest (behavior over the employee’s
tenure). From these two time periods, three intermediate continuous variables were
created: the at-risk variable, the change variable, and the baseline variable. For each
behavior, two final dichotomous variables were created, one for the at-risk variable, and
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one for the change variable. There were two final binary logistic regression models, one
that included only the at-risk dichotomous variables, and the other will include only the
change variables.
Operationalization of Risky Behavior Indicators
Phase 2, Step 2, of this developmental research study was the operationalization
of the variables into indicators for analysis, and perform data investigation using the AIInCyThR proof-of-concept prototype on simulated user activity data available from
CERT/SEI/CMU. The readily available data set simulates an “aggregated collection of
logs from host based sensors distributed across all the computer workstations within a
large business or government organization over a 500-day period” (Lindauer et al., 2013,
p. 81). The simulated data set represents the logon, external media, HTTP, email, and file
access activity of over 4100 simulated users. This simulated data set also presents a
simulated users demographic within the organization, as well as a static set of personality
traits based on the Five Factor Model of personality.
This research study aimed at defining and measuring the relationships between
the following indicators for the detection of malicious cybersecurity insider threat:
Logon – Malicious activity will be defined as the number of days in the time period of
interest that a user logs in after hours.
1. Create three continuous variables called “Days_AH_Login_B”(After-Hours;
baseline), “Days_AH_Login_C” (% change from baseline), and
“Days_AH_Login_R” (at-risk) and will run descriptives to aid in the
dichotimization of these variables, including mean, median, skewness, kurtosis,
and the frequency distribution.
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2. From these descriptive analysis results provide the at-risk and change variable
will be dichotomized based on a predetermined cut off. The variables will be
called, “AH_Login_R”, and “AH_Login_C”. The cut-off will be chosen such that
there is a sufficient number of users in each group. Prior to examining the
descriptive data, a reasonable cut off for “AH_Login_R” is at least 30% of the
days login after hours (or nine out of 30 days). A reasonable cut off for
“AH_Login_C” is at least 30% above baseline use.
External Device – The number of days in the period of interest of which a user connects
an external device three or more times in one day.
1. Create three continuous variables called “Days_ED_B”(External Device;
baseline), “Days_ED_C” (% change from baseline), “Days_ED_R” (at-risk) and
will run full descriptive analysis.
2. From these descriptive analysis results provide the at-risk and change variables
will be dichotomized based on a chosen cut off. The variables will be called,
“ED_R” and “ED_C”. The cut-off will be chosen such that there is a sufficient
number of users in each group. Prior to examining the descriptive data a
reasonable cut off for “ED_R” is at least one day where the user used an external
device more than three times in the day. A reasonable cut-off for the change
variable is having at least one more day external device usage above baseline.
HTTP – Two types of variables will be created, (1) the number of days in the period of
interest that the user exceeding either three uploads or three downloads to an external
HTTP site per day; (2) the number of days in the period of interest that the user visited an
HTTP landing page that contained a “risky” word. The risky word will be identified
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using word content filtering, and compared to the identified words listed in the keyword
dictionary as outlined in Table 27, and will be flagged, as well as, categorized as a policy
violation per the individual employee.
1. Created three continuous variables called “Days_HTTP_B” (http; baseline),
“Days_HTTP_C” (% change from baseline), “Days_HTTP_R” (at-risk) and ran
full descriptive analysis.
2. From these descriptive analysis results, the at-risk and change variables were
dichotomized based on a chosen cut off. The variables were called, “HTTP_R”,
“HTTP_C”. The cut-off was chosen such that there was a sufficient number of
users in each group. Prior to examining the descriptive data, a reasonable cut off
for “HTTP_R” was at least one day where the user used an external device more
than three times in the day. A reasonable cut-off for the change variable was
having at least one more day of questionable HTTP activity above baseline.
3. For word content filtering a dichotomous variable were created, called
“HTTP_RW” (HTTP; Risky Word).
4. A composite four level categorical variable was created to capture both the
dichotomous HTTP_R variable and the HTTP_RW variables.
a. (0) = Neither HTTP_R or HTTP_RW
b. (1) = HTTP_R Positive and HTTP_RW Negative
c. (2) = HTT_R Negative and HTTP_RW Positive
d. (3) = Both HTTP_R and HTTP_RW are Positive
Email – Two types of variables were created, (1) the number of days in the period of
interest in which user exceeded sending 5 emails with attachments to an external email
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address per day (not in the simulated *@dtaa.com domain); (2) the number of days in the
period of interest in which the user sent or received an email that contained a “risky”
word. The risky word was identified using word content filtering, compared to the
identified words listed in the keyword dictionary, and was flagged as well as categorized
as a policy violation per the individual user.
1. Created three continuous variables called “Days_Email_B”(email; baseline) ,
“Days_Email_C” (% change from baseline), “Days_Email_R” (at-risk) and ran
full descriptive analysis.
2. From these descriptive analysis results, the at-risk and change variables were
dichotomized based on a chosen cut off. The variables were called, “Email_R” ,
“Email_C”. The cut-off was chosen such that there was a sufficient number of
users in each group. Prior to examining the descriptive data a reasonable cut off
for “Email_R” was at least one day where the user sent an email with attachment
to an external domain more than five times in the day. A reasonable cut-off for the
change variable was having at least one more day of questionable email activity
above baseline.
3. For word content filtering a dichotomous variable was created, called
“Email_RW” (Email; Risky Word).
4. A composite four level categorical variable was created to capture both the
dichotomous Email_R variable and the Email_RW variables.
a. (0) = Neither Email_R or Email_RW
b. (1) = Email_R Positive and Email_RW Negative
c. (2) = Email_R Negative and Email_RW Positive
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d. (3) = Both Email_R and Email_RW are Positive
File Access – The number of days in the period of interest of which a user copies a file to
an external device three or more times in the day.
1. Created three continuous variables called “Days_FA_B”(File Access; baseline) ,
“Days_FA_C” (% change from baseline), “Days_FA_R” (at-risk) and ran full
descriptive analysis.
2. From these descriptive analysis results, the at-risk and change variables were
dichotomized based on a chosen cut off. The variables were called, “FA_R”,
“FA_C”. The cut-off was chosen such that there was a sufficient number of users
in each group. Prior to examining the descriptive data a reasonable cut off for
“FA_R” was at least one day where the user copied a file to an external device
more than three times in the day. A reasonable cut-off for the change variable was
having at least one more day file copy to external device above baseline.
Demographic – This table contains an employee demographics across the organization.
This information may be useful for later data exploration and for determining if user role
may influence tendency towards malicious actors. This information can be weighted and
correlated with user actions in determining a user propensity towards malicious activity.
Specifically, does the users role (e.g. IT Staffer, Engineer, etc.) moderate the relationship
between the risky behaviors (the predictors) and the malicious use (the dependent
variable).
Decoy File – The total number of decoy files that a user access’s and performs and
activity (HTTP, Email, Copy) during the period of interest.
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1. Created one continuous variable “Number_Decoy_R”, and ran full descriptive
analysis.
2. From these descriptive analysis results, the at-risk variable were dichotomized
based on a chosen cut off. The variable was called “Decoy_R”. Prior to
examining the descriptive data a reasonable cut off for “Decoy_R” was at least
one file, where the user accessed a decoy file.
This table includes a list of files that can be used as decoys/honeypot to determine
which computer accessed the file. Employee and pc relationships can be used in the
weighting of a user’s propensity towards malicious activity.
Psychometric – These are five continuous indicators which were used as predictors for
malicious use. The psychometric scale rates employees on a numerical scale. Depending
on where an employee lands on the scale, per personality trait being assessed, Openness,
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, or Neuroticism. This information was
included in a regression model to predict a user’s propensity towards malicious activity.
1. The dataset includes five continuous indictors for each user: “Psychometric_O”,
“Psychometric_C” , “Psychometric_E” , “Psychometric_A” , “Psychometric_N.”
For each indicator, full descriptives were run, including the mean, median, mode,
and standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis, and frequency distribution
2. From these descriptives, each variable may have been dichotomized based on a
median split.
Total Risk Score – A total risk score was created which encompasses the total count
of risky technical and psychometric indicators per user using bivariate logistic
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regression to predict a malicious user, creating a baseline and change in total risk
score.
1. Created two continuous indictors “Total_B”, “Total_C”, and ran full
descriptive analysis.
2. From these descriptive analysis results, each indictor may have been
dichotomized based on a median split per each employee.
In continuation, Step 3, of Phase 2 of this developmental research study
operationalized these modeling approaches throughout the data analysis process, refining
the collected data to identify possible false positives or false negatives. In addressing
RQ5a, the result provided for each predictor the prevalence of false positive. A crosstab
was produced of each bivariate technical predictor and the dichotomous malicious user
outcome variable. A false positive was defined as when the technical predictor is not
risky and the malicious user indictor indicated a malicious user.
In addressing RQ5b, the result was for each predictor the prevalence of false
negatives. A crosstab was produced of each bivariate technical predictor and the
dichotomous malicious user outcome indictor. A false negative was defined as when the
technical predictor is risky and the malicious user indictors indicated a non-malicious
user. Once this analysis has been achieved with the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept
prototype, the fifth specific goal was met and RQ5a and RQ5b was addressed.
According to Carson (1986), “one of the main problems facing the simulation
modeler is gaining the user’s or client’s acceptance of model accuracy” (p. 74). To assist
with model verification, validation, and credibility, Caron (1986) identified the
distinction between verification, validation, and credibility, which are needed in building
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an accurate model that is convincing to the end-users, and an accurate representation of
the real system and be used in the decision-making process (p. 74).
•

Verification: The process in identifying whether the model is performing
as it was designed

•

Validation: The process where both the modeler and end-user determine
how accurately the model represents reality.

•

Credibility: A model which is accepted by the client and is used as an aid
in the decision-making process (Carson, 1986)

This developmental research study incorporated these techniques throughout the
prototype development process, in order to maintain model accuracy for the particular
objectives of this research study (Law, 2009).
Phase 2, Step 4, of this developmental research study measures “both the
correlation function and the mutual information measure correlations within one
sequence known as ‘autocorrelations,’ or between two sequences known as ‘crosscorrelations,’ within the data” (Herzel & Große, 1995, p. 519), allowing for the detection
of all dependences. This assisted in addressing RQ6, and identifying which activity
indicators were identified the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as significant
indicators to identify insider threat activity. The results of this analysis was a bivariate
and multivariate logistic regression to identify the relationship (odds ratio) between an
indicator and a malicious user. For example, the bivariate logistic regression will give an
odds ratio that indicates how much more likely the risky group is likely to be a malicious
user, compared to the non-risky group. The multi-variate logistic regression gives the
odds ratio for each predictor adjusting for other predictors in the model.
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In the course of Phase 1, the expert panel completed a two-stage Delphi technique
to identify the significant indicators, indicator relationships, and indicator weights which
were measured to identify “the strength of association between a pair of data vectors”
(Shimodaira, 2016, p. 126). Linear regression models were run on the data to determine
indicator correlations. Once this stage was completed, a set of evidence and/or
correlations as precursors to malicious cybersecurity insider threat events were produced
and the sixth specific goal was met, as well as, RQ6 was addressed.
Phase 3 – Analysis of Evidence Against MSB
During Phase 3 of this developmental research study an analysis of the collected
evidence and/or correlations against the previously identified MSB was performed. One
of the main objectives of this research study was to develop logistic regression models of
malicious cybersecurity insider threat as a function of risky behavior predictors. This was
accomplished by first identifying and analyzing bivariate associations among the
predictors as well as bivariate association between the predictors and the insider threat
outcome. The latter was performed for three reasons, 1) in the event that there was a
strong relationship between two predictors (multi-collinearity) the indictor with the
stronger bivariate association with insider threat outcome was selected, and the other
indictor dropped from the logistic regression model. 2) This provided an association
(unadjusted) in which to compare whether the addition of other covariates in the logistic
regression model affect the bivariate association of interest. 3) This allowed for the
validation of the accuracy of the SME’s predicted association between each risky
behavior and insider threat outcome.
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The approach for determining bivariate association depends on the scale of the
particular predictor and outcome. For bivariate associations with two dichotomous
indictors a tetrachoric correlation was obtained. Tetrachoric correlation is applicable
when both observed “either-or” variables are dichotomous, as explained by Howell
(2010, p. 303).
Statistical Measures of Association
As described above the type of measure of association i.e. correlation was
determined based on the scale of the indicators. Gingrich (2004), explained that “methods
of correlation summarize the relationship between two variables in a single number called
the correlation coefficient” (p. 795). According to Goodwin and Leech (2006),
correlation is one of the most commonly used statistical techniques in research. It is
understood that the most widely used correlation statistic is the Pearson Product-Moment
correlation coefficient (Pearson r) (Danacica, 2017; Goodwin & Leech, 2006). Moreover,
Goodwin and Leech (2006) explained:
“The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient describes the size and
direction of linear relationship between two continuous variables (generically
represented by X and Y), and range from -1.0 (perfect negative relationship) to
+1.0 (perfect positive relationship); if no relationship exists between the two
variables, the value of the correlation is zero. The symbol rxy (or r) is used to
present the correlation calculated.” (p. 252)
Pearsons r can also be used to describe the association between two dichotomous
variables. Rovai, Baker, and Ponton (2013), explained that Pearson r is symmetric,
meaning that the same coefficient value is obtained regardless of which variable is the
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independent variable or the dependent variable. While the Pearson r values range from -1
£ r £ 1; Hinkle, Wiersma, and Jurs (2003) noted that the absolute values of Pearson r can
be interpreted by the size of the correlation coefficient as shown in Table 27.
Table 27
Correlation Coefficient Interpretation
Size of Correlation

Interpretation

.90 to 1.00 (-.90 to -1.00)

Very high positive (negative) correlation

.70 to .90 (-.70 to -.90)

High positive (negative) correlation

.50 to .70 (-.50 to -.70)

Moderate positive (negative) correlation

.30 to .50 (-.30 to -.50)

Low positive (negative) correlation

.00 to .30 (.00 to -.30)

Little if any correlation

Ordinal Logistic Regression
As noted by Mertler and Vannatta (2013), regression is a statistical tool that
allows researchers to investigate the effect of independent variables [IVs] (predictive
indicators in this study) on the dependent variable [DV] (p. 298). For example, the effect
of an employee’s single technical activity (i.e. a predictive indicator) on the employee’s
predisposition towards malicious insider threat activity (DV) In predictive analysis,
multiple Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR) is applied to measures the effect of two or
more IVs (predictive indicators in this study) on one dichotomous DV (Lani, 2018). For
example, the effect of an employee’s technical activities (IV1) and psychometric rating
(IV2) on the employee’s predisposition towards malicious insider threat activity (DV). As
explained by Mertler and Vannatta (2010), in standard multiple regression all the IV’s are
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entered concurrently; therefore, the effect of the IV’s on the DV is evaluated in terms of
what it adds to the prediction of the DV as specified by regression equation (p. 164).
Analysis of the Simulated Data Set
A Pearson’s correlation matrix was produced of the predictors as an initial test of
multi-collinearity. Correlations >= .7 were suspected as multi-collinear for purposes of a
multivariate analysis. A separate correlation matrix with outcome variables will be
available. Bivariate ordinal logistic regression were run with malicious user as the
outcome and each predictor. This provided unadjusted odds ratios, indicating the amount
of risk of being a malicious user as a function of the predictor. For example, an odds ratio
of 2.5 for the risky logon variable, means that users identified as having risky logon use,
have 2.5 times the odds of being a malicious actor, than those users who do not have
risky logon use. The residual probability of being a malicious user was obtained for each
model, this being a dichotomous variable. Any user with a probability > .5 will be
considered a malicious user. A two by two cross tab was calculated on the actual
malicious users, versus the model identified malicious users, to look for rates of false
positives and false negatives, and other sensitivity analysis.
Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR) was then performed as the non-linear
predictive model that includes all the technical behaviors, and psychometric indicators as
IVs, and the employee’s predisposition towards malicious insider threat activity as DV.
This showed the effect of each predictor after controlling for each predictor in the model.
The residual probability of being a malicious user was obtained for each model, this
being a dichotomous variable. Any user with a probability > .5 was considered a
malicious user. A two by two cross tab on the actual malicious users, versus the model
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identified malicious users, to look for rates of false positives and false negatives, and
other sensitivity analysis. The false positive and false negative rates should be improved
since there are more predictors that are correlated with the outcomes.
Bivariate and multivariate analysis were run separately for the at-risk predictors.
Word Content Filtering
The importance of email and Internet use in the workplace has been well
documented; organizations allow for limited personal Internet use, including social
media, in an effort to reduce an employee’s negative affect associated with the
workplace, and the employers desire for productivity (Vitak, Crouse, & LaRose, 2011;
Garrett & Danziger, 2008). Greitzer et al. (2014) explained that another source of
psychosocial data is text written by an employee when sending emails using the
organizational email system or a sampling of employee social media use approved by the
organization (p. 121). Findings from prior research and case studies suggest the presence
of personality predispositions in malicious actors, specifically that there is a significant
association between word use and personality traits (Greitzer et al., 2014, p. 121); as well
as, according to McCrae (2010) a relationship exists between word use and FFM.
As noted earlier, data mining refers to the process of knowledge discovery in data,
content monitoring and filtering allows organizations to address the issue of data crossing
organizational network boundaries (Proctor & Mogull, 2006). Tools such as Secure
Email Gateways and Secure Web Gateways provide a method in which organizations can
filter inbound and outbound email message or URL requests against organizationally
defined keyword dictionaries or blacklists and can help protect company assets
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(Firstbrook & Wynne, 2015; Orans & Firstbrook, 2015). Greitzer et al. (2014) expanded
on the use of commercial tools and the detection of malicious insider threats saying,
With some additional analysis it is possible to use output from network auditing
appliances to discover psychosocial factors that suggest increased insider threat
risk. Specifically the analysis of text used in email and social media
communication may be analyzed to identify associated personality traits or
psychosocial risk factors (p. 122).
For the purposes of this research study, a risky keyword dictionary outlined by the DHS
National Operations Center (NOC) Media Monitoring Capability (MMC) Desktop
Reference Binder (Department of Homeland Security, 2011) was used as the foundation
to analyze an employee’s inbound and outbound email and HTTP activity. An employee
who was determined to have a risky word identified in the risky keyword dictionary in
their email or HTTP activity was weighted as having a higher propensity to malicious
insider threat activity. This rating contributed to the “Total Risk Score” indicator to assist
in the prediction of malicious cybersecurity insider threats. Finally, in Phase 3, a report
with conclusions and recommendations was produced, meeting the seventh specific goal
and addressing RQ7. Table 28 outlined the risky keyword dictionary by threat type and
risky words for analysis as identified by DHS.
Table 28
Risky Keyword Dictionary
Keyword Category

Description

Author(s)
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Domestic Security

Assassination, Attack, Domestic security, Drill,
Exercise, Cops, Law enforcement, Authorities,
Disaster assistance, Disaster management, DNDO
(Domestic Nuclear Detection Office),
preparedness,National Mitigation, Prevention,
Response,Recovery, Dirty bomb, Domestic nuclear
detection, Emergency management, Emergency
response, First responder, Homeland security,
Maritime domain awareness (MDA), National
preparedness, Initiative, Hostage, Explosion

Department of
Homeland Security
(2011)

HAZMAT & Nuclear

Hazmat, Nuclear, Chemical spill, Suspicious
package/device, Toxic, National laboratory, Nuclear
facility, Nuclear threat, Cloud, Plume, Radiation,
Radioactive, Leak, Biological infection (or event),
Chemical, Chemical burn, Biological, Epidemic,
Hazardous, Hazardous material incident, Industrial
spill, Infection, Powder (white), Gas, Spillover,
Anthrax, Blister agent, Chemical agent, Exposure,
Burn, Nerve agent, Ricin, Sarin, North Korea

Department of
Homeland Security
(2011)

Health Concern &
H1N1

Outbreak, Contamination, Exposure, Virus,
Evacuation, Bacteria, Recall, Ebola, Food Poisoning,
Foot and Mouth (FMD), H5N1, Avian, Flu,
Salmonella, Small Pox, Plague, Human to human,
Human to Animal, Influenza, Center for Disease
Control (CDC), Drug Administration (FDA), Public
Health, Toxic, Agro Terror, Tuberculosis (TB),
Agriculture Listeria Symptoms Mutation Resistant,
Antiviral, Wave, Pandemic, Infection, Water/air
borne, Sick, Swine, Pork, Strain, Quarantine, H1N1,
Vaccine, Tamiflu, Norvo Virus, Epidemic, World
Health Organization (WHO) (and components),
Viral, Hemorrhagic Fever, E. Coli

Department of
Homeland Security
(2011)

Infrastructure Security

Infrastructure security, Airport, Airplane (and
derivatives), Chemical fire, CIKR (Critical
Infrastructure & Key Resources), AMTRAK,
Collapse, Computer infrastructure, Communications,
Infrastructure, Telecommunications, Critical
infrastructure, National infrastructure, Metro,
WMATA, Subway, BART, MARTA, Port
Authority, NBIC (National Biosurveillance
Integration, Center), Transportation security, Grid,
Power, Smart, Body scanner, Electric, Failure or
outage, Black out, Brown out, Port, Dock, Bridge,
Cancelled, Delays, Service disruption, Power lines

Department of
Homeland Security
(2011)
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Table 28
Risky Keyword Dictionary (Cont.)
Keyword Category

Description

Author(s)

Southwest Border
Violence

La Familia, Reynosa, Nuevo Leon, Narcos, Narco
banners (Spanish equivalents), Los Zetas, Shootout,
Execution, Gunfight, Trafficking, Kidnap, Calderon,
Reyosa, Bust, Tamaulipas, Meth Lab, Drug trade,
Illegal immigrants, Smuggling (smugglers),
Matamoros, Michoacana, Guzman, Arellano-Felix,

Department of
Homeland Security
(2011)

Southwest Border
Violence

Drug cartel, Violence, Gang, Drug, Narcotics,
Cocaine, Marijuana, Heroin, Border, Mexico, Cartel,
Southwest, Juarez, Sinaloa, Tijuana, Torreon, Yuma,
Tucson, Decapitated, U.S. Consulate, Consular, El
Paso, Fort Hancock, San Diego, Ciudad Juarez,
Nogales, Sonora, Colombia, Mara salvatrucha,
MS13, MS-13, Drug war, Mexican army,
Methamphetamine, Cartel de Golfo, Gulf Cartel,

Department of
Homeland Security
(2011)

Terrorism

Terrorism, Al Qaeda, Terror, Attack, Iraq,
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Agro, Environmental
terrorist, Eco terrorism, Conventional weapon,
Target, Weapons grade, Dirty bomb, Enriched,
Nuclear, Chemical weapon, Biological weapon,
Ammonium nitrate, Improvised explosive device,
IED (Improvised Explosive Device), Abu Sayyaf,
Hamas, FARC (Armed Revolutionary Forces
Colombia), IRA (Irish Republican Army), ETA
(Euskadi ta Askatasuna), Basque Separatists,
Hezbollah, Tamil, Tigers, PLF (Palestine Liberation
Front), PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), Car

Department of
Homeland Security
(2011)

Weather Emergency

Emergency, Hurricane, Tornado, Twister, Tsunami,
Earthquake, Tremor, Flood, Storm, Crest, Temblor,
Extreme weather, Forest fire, Brush fire, Ice,
Stranded/Stuck, Help, Hail, Wildfire, Tsunami
Warning Center, Magnitude, Avalanche, Typhoon,
Shelter-in-place, Disaster, Snow, Blizzard, Sleet,
Mud slide, Mudslide, Erosion, Power outage, Brown
out, Warning, Watch, Lightening, Aid, Relief,
Closure, Interstate, Burst, Emergency Broadcast
System

Department of
Homeland Security
(2011)
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Table 28
Risky Keyword Dictionary (Cont.)
Keyword Category

Description

Author(s)

Cyber Security

Cyber security, Cybersecurity, cybersecurity, Botnet,
DDOS (dedicated denial of service), DOS (Denial of
service), Malware, Virus, Trojan, Keylogger, Cyber
Command, 2600, Spammer, Phishing, Rootkit,
Phreaking, Cain and abel, Brute forcing, Mysql
injection, Cyber attack, cyber-attack, cyber attack,
Cyber terror, Hacker, China, Conficker, Worm,
Scammers, Social media, AA Keylogger,
Jobhunting, Jobsearch, Closing Project

Department of
Homeland Security
(2011)

Population and Sample
With the AI-InCyThR system, synthetic user activity over a 500 day period was
analyzed for correlations between the expert panel-identified indicators and any
anomalies outside of the MSB, identifying possible malicious user activity. Expert panel
responses were recorded in a SurveyMonkey spreadsheet. Anomalies and correlations
were recorded within the AI-InCyThR system and presented as correlation visualizations.
According to Mertler and Vannatta (2010), one of the reasons for pre-analysis data
screening is to ensure the accuracy of the data. As they noted, “the results of any
statistical analysis are only as good the data analyzed” (p. 25). Mertler and Vannatta
(2010) further elaborated that data must be checked for accuracy, since inaccurate data
may cause erroneous conclusions.
Data Analysis
As noted by Seuring and Müller (2008), each round of the Delphi technique must
be fully documented in order to conduct Delphi technique data analysis. Hasson, Keeney,
and McKenna (2000), explained that it is recommended for Delphi technique studies to
show the central tendencies and levels of dispersion for each Delphi round. Levels of
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dispersion include standard deviation and the inter-quartile range, while central
tendencies include means, medians, and mode (Hasson et al., 2000; Skinner et al., 2015).
By computing SMEs responses for Delphi 1 and Delphi 2, the means, or average of the
SMEs responses were revealed for each item. As well, in computing the medians, the
middle value of the SME responses were revealed. Subsequently, the computed modes
reveal the most common of the SME response for each item outlined in the survey
instrument, with the standard deviation revealing the level of agreement among the SMEs
selections. Accordingly, the interquartile range is a measure of variability that is
produced by dividing the responses into quartiles.
The expert panel elicitation and AI-InCyThR system pilot test were the
foundation to develop a valid and reliable assessment of precursors to malicious insider
threat activity. Additionally, an empirical study using the AI-InCyThR system was
conducted using 16 months of simulated user activity. Alias (2015) explained that by
using an iterative process, increased instrument validity and reliability can be achieved.
With the use of a literature review and an expert panel, this study sought to address RQ1
to identify what the most important cybersecurity indicators are, as validated by the
experts. This study sought to address RQ2 by utilizing the literature review and expert
panel feedback to establish the indicator categories for the most pertinent indicator
categorizations. This research also sought to determine the weight for each expert panel
validated indicator, and what are the expert-identified most significant correlations
between cybersecurity indicators. This was accomplished through the second-round
iterative use of the Delphi technique to address RQ3 and RQ4.
Data Analysis with the Proof-of-Concept Prototype
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This research sought to address RQ5a by identifying the prevalence of false
positives for each predictor. This was accomplished by producing a crosstab of each
bivariate technical predictor and the dichotomous malicious user outcome variable. A
false positive was defined as when the technical predictor is not risky and the malicious
user variable indicated a malicious user. This research sought to address RQ5b by
identifying the prevalence of false negatives for each predictor. This was accomplished
by producing a cross tab of each bivariate technical predictor and the dichotomous
malicious user outcome variable. A false negative was defined as when the technical
predictor is risky and the malicious user variable indicated a non-malicious user.
In addition, the results of RQ5a and RQ5b were false positive and false negative
rates obtained from the full logistic regression model that includes all predictors
simultaneously. A dichotomous predicted malicious user indicator was obtained from the
predicted probabilities that are output from this logistic regression model and compared
against the actual malicious user variable in a cross tab. A false positive in this case in
when the predicted malicious user is negative (i.e. non-malicious user) but the actual
malicious user indicator is positive (i.e. malicious user). A false negative in this case in
when the predicted malicious user is positive (i.e. malicious user) but the actual malicious
user indicator is positive (i.e. non-malicious user).
This research study aimed to address RQ6 by determining what simulated user
activity indicators were identified by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as
significant indicators to identify insider threat activity. This was accomplished by
producing a bivariate and multivariate logistic regression to identify the relationship
(odds ratio) between an indicator and a malicious user. For example, the bivariate logistic
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regression gave an odds ratio that indicates how much more likely the risky group is
likely to be a malicious user, compared to the non-risky group. The multivariate logistic
regression gets the odds ratio for each predictor adjusting for other predictors in the
model.
The results of RQ7 were the SME identified correlations (DV & each predictor)
collected in Delphi 2 and outlined in RQ4 compared against the Pearson’s correlations
(DV & each predictor) empirically-derived from the insider threat data. In order to
understand the degree to which SMEs on average underestimate/overestimate the
empirically-derived correlations for each DV/predictor combination, the SME
correlations for each DV/predictor combination were averaged and compared against the
DV/predictor correlations derived from the insider threat data set. For purposes of
discussion, “small”, “medium” and “large” differences between SME- and empiricallyderived correlations were operationalized as follows: small (0 to +/- 0.10), medium (+/0.11 to 0. 40), large (> +/- 0.40). Linear and Non-Linear correlations with a significant
difference and those with little difference were identified and discussed. The average
predictor-outcome correlation score was calculated across the SME’s for each predictoroutcome pair and compared against the actual correlations derived from the insider threat
data set.

Proof-of-Concept Tool and Simulation
Simulated Data Sample
As noted by Barse, Kvarnstrom, and Johnson (2003), synthetic data is defined as
data that is generated by simulated users in a simulated environment, performing
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simulated actions or activities. These simulations may include human behaviors, or be
altogether an automated process (Barse et al., 2003). When using simulated data, great
care must be taken to be certain that the simulated data is a true representation of the
types of activity that would be expected in real-world scenarios (Hill & Malone, 2004)
This is because, as noted by Hill and Malone (2004), data which is too clean or wellarranged will present misleading results. According to Hauduc et al. (2010), “the quality
of simulation results can be significantly affected by errors in the model (typing,
inconsistencies, gaps, or conceptual errors) and/or in the underlying model description”
(p. 1). Furthermore, Hill and Malone (2004) indicated that “benchmarking the dataset can
resolve these issues by ensuring the data is realistic” (p. 968). Benchmarking involves
comparing the dataset against a series of problems that are both understood and accepted,
which will improve the simulated data’s credibility (Hill & Malone, 2004).
The simulated dataset that was used for this study provided test data representing
500 days of user activity, or roughly a year and a half of simulated user activity, for a
simulated large organization. Accordingly, the simulated data was categorized and
referred to as indicators based on the type of simulated user activity and preconditioned
database table classification.
Pilot-Test Initial System
The pilot test of the initial application analyzed three time sets of user activity and
event correlation per employee;
1) The initial 60-day period that an employee logged in, this sets the initial user
baseline of activity. This time frame was chosen because as noted by Spears and
Barki (2010), in the context of regulatory compliance, to adhere to the Sarbanes-
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Oxley act of 2002, “a control must be implemented for two months before its
performance can be audited” (p. 515);
2) A period-of-interest encompassing the employee’s total period-of-employment.
Review of this timeframe allowed for comparison of baseline behavior and any
deviations, either positive or negative, in employee activity and behavior.
3) The timeframe which deviation from baseline activity was observed.
As explained by Collins, Onwuegbuzie, and Sutton (2006), the goal in every study,
regardless of research field, “is to obtain data that has one or more of the following
characteristics: trustworthiness, credibility, dependability, legitimation, validity,
plausibility, applicability, consistency, neutrality, reliability, objectivity, confirmability,
and/or transferability” (p. 77). Moreover, Collins et al. (2006), elaborated that
“instrument fidelity rationale relates to the steps taken by the researcher to maximize the
appropriateness and/or utility of the instruments used in the study” (p. 77). Thus, the
main focus of this pilot-test was expert panel instrument fidelity. The following phase of
the pilot-test evaluated outcome validity. Collins et al. (2006), iterated that outcome
validity assesses the “meaning of scores and intended and unintended consequences of
using the instrument” (p. 81). Accordingly, proper testing and an expert panel was
essential in establishing the fidelity of the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype, as
well as, validate the indicators. The results and observations of this pilot test were
evaluated and all adjustments to the indicators of the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept
prototype were completed.
Design and Empirical Study: Revised Proof-of-Concept Prototype
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Subsequently, once the initial proof-of-concept prototype was revised, an
empirical study was administered using the already developed and validated proof-ofconcept prototype. During this phase of the developmental research study, analysis of the
simulated user activity over a 60-day period (Spears & Bakari, 2010) was conducted, and
the results of this measure documented. Moreover, any recommendations resulting from
the data analysis were provided; information regarding the simulated user activity
follows.
Table 29
Summary of Research Question (RQ) Triangulation
Research Question (RQ)

Methodology

Data Categorization

RQ1: What are the important
cybersecurity indicators
validated by the expert panel
that can assist in the detection
of insider threat activity?

Delphi technique, expert panel
elicitation

Extraction of cybersecurity
indicators from SME’s opinion

RQ2: What are the expert
validated cybersecurity
indicators categories?

Delphi technique, expert panel
elicitation

Extraction of cybersecurity
indicator categories from SME’s
opinion

RQ3: What are the expertapproved-weights for the
identified cybersecurity
indicators?

Delphi technique, expert panel
elicitation

Extraction of cybersecurity
indicator weights from SME’s
opinion

RQ4: What are the expertidentified most significant
correlations between
cybersecurity indicators?

Delphi technique, expert panel
elicitation

Extraction of possible malicious
activity based on indicator
correlations as identified by
SME’s opinion

RQ5a: What cybersecurity
indicators were identified in
experimental settings to have a
high rate of false positives as
measured by the AI-InCyThR
prototype?

Prototype testing, SMB
comparison

Results will be the prevalence of
false positives for each predictor.
A false positive is defined as a
technical predictor indicating the
user is a malicious user
(probability from logistic
regression model > 0.50) when, in
actuality, the user is not a
malicious user.
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Table 29
Summary of Research Question (RQ) Triangulation (Cont.)
Research Question (RQ)

Methodology

Data Categorization

RQ5b: What cybersecurity
indicators were identified in
experimental settings to have a
high rate of false negatives as
measured by the AI-InCyThR
prototype?

Prototype testing, SMB
comparison

Results will be the prevalence of
false negatives for each predictor.
A false negative is defined a
technical predictor indicating the
user is not a malicious user
(probability from logistic
regression model < 0.50) when, in
actuality, the use is a malicious
user.

RQ6: What simulated user
activity indicators were
identified by the AI-InCyThR
proof-of-concept prototype as
significant indicators to identify
insider threat activity?

Prototype output

Results will be bivariate and
multivariate ordinal logistic
regressions to identify the
unadjusted and adjusted
relationships (OR), respectively,
between the indicators and the
malicious user DV.

RQ7: How are the simulated
user activity correlations that
were identified by the SME’s
different than those identified
by the AI-InCyThR proof-ofconcept prototype as
significant correlations to
identify insider threat activity?

Prototype output and Delphi
technique, expert panel elicitation

Results of RQ7 will be the SME
identified correlations (DV &
each predictor) collected in
Delphi 2 and outlined in RQ4
compared against the Pearson’s
correlations (DV & each
predictor) empirically-derived
from the insider threat data. In
order to understand the degree to
which SMEs on average
underestimate/overestimate the
empirically-derived correlations
for each DV/predictor
combination, the SME
correlations for each
DV/predictor combination will be
averaged and compared against
the DV/predictor correlations
derived from the data set.

Reliability and Validity
As noted by Creswell (2012), the reliability and validity of an instrument should,
in essence, provide “an accurate assessment of the variables and enable the researcher to
draw inferences to a sample or population” (p. 180). Furthermore, Campbell (1957)
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detailed the importance of both internal and external validity, and elaborated that internal
validity is achieved when the research makes a significant difference in the specific
study. As indicated by Ellis and Levy (2009), “internal validity refers to the extent to
which its design and the data that it yields allows the researcher to draw accurate
conclusions about cause-and-effect and other relationships within the data” (p. 334).
Therefore, Salkin (2010) contended that the reliability and validity of a measurement
instrument is of the utmost importance, acting as the first screen against inaccurate
conclusions on the data being analyzed. Regarding Delphi expert methodology,
McFadzean, Ezingeard, and Birchall (2011), noted, “the approach ensures that the data
collection process is both reliable and valid because it exposes the investigation to
differing, and often divergent, opinions and seeks convergence through structured
feedback” (p. 108). In their work, Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989) stated, “in a
complementary mixed-method study, qualitative and quantitative methods are used to
measure overlapping but also different facets of a phenomenon, yielding an enriched,
elaborated understanding of that phenomenon” (p. 258).
According to Hill and Malone (2004), using simulated data to develop and study
diagnostic tools for data analysis is very beneficial. Simulations can be used to suggest an
appropriate approximate model, as well as to determine how good an approximation of a
given analytic model is (Ignall, Kolesar, & Walker, 1978). Furthermore, Reilly, Staid,
Gao, and Guikema (2016) explained that “simulation models are widely used in risk
analysis to study the effects if uncertainties on outcomes of interest in complex
problems” (p. 1844).
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Robinson (1997) explained that a very “significant element of any simulation
study is verification and validation (V&V) of the simulation model” (p. 53). According to
Robinson (1997), a thorough V&V lays the groundwork on which confidence in the study
results can be placed. Davis (1992) noted that verification is the process of assuring that
the (conceptual) model that has been converted into a computer model meets the
developer’s conceptual description and specifications with sufficient accuracy.
Validation, according to Carson (1986), consists of the actions taken to assure that the
model is fittingly accurate for the functions at hand.
Reliability
The AI-InCyThR was developed to measure the correlations between the
fictitious username and an activity as they relate to the established MSB, creating an
index of malicious cybersecurity insider threat event precursors. According to Helminen,
Halonen, Rankinen, Nissinen, and Rauramaa (1995), the reliability of an index is
determined by reproducibility and consistency. Reliability is important in that it indicates
the measure of lack of bias, and is indicative of stability and consistency (Sekaran, 2003).
By definition, reliability establishes that the “individual scores from an instrument should
be nearly the same or staple on repeated administrations of the instrument, they should be
free from sources of measurement error, and they should be consistent” (Creswell, 2002,
p. 180). Thus, the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype assessment was validated
through testing. As username and event correlations were developed, each correlation
was given a score. The overall correlation scores were auto-calculated through the AIInCyThR algorithm engine.
Validity
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Creswell (2002) described validity as the researcher’s ability to gather significant
and relevant generalizations from the survey scores collected. Straub (1989) argued, “that
instrument validation at any level can be of considerable help to MIS researchers in
substantiating their findings” (p. 162). According to Alias (2015), in general, “measures
are valid if they are relevant and clean measures of what the researcher wants to assess”
(p. 18). Straub (2015) further elaborated that validity deals with the appropriateness of
the method to the research question, which involves the validity of the researcher’s
interpretation of the data (p. 18). Boudreau, Gefen, and Straub (2001) noted that content
validity is another attribute, which is collected and coded. This validity is generally
established through literature reviews as well as expert panels. Thus, this study reduced
the threat to validity by using input indicators validated by an expert panel that follows
the Delphi technique as noted by Ramim and Lichvar (2014).

Resources
In accordance with Nova Southeastern University IRB Policies and Procedures,
IRB approval is required to work with human subjects. Access to the cybersecurity
industry experts is necessary to follow the Delphi technique expert panel method, as well
as, contracting a software developer for developing the AI-InCyThR application. The
software prototype was built in a virtual environment using open source tools and
operating systems, such as Linux. Fifty $10 gift cards were given out as an incentive and
reward for expert panel participation in the research study. Following the collection of the
data, a statistical software program was utilized for data analysis.
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Summary
Chapter 3 provided an overview of the methodology for this study. This study was
classified as “developmental,” and utilized a mixed-method approach both to weigh and
validate the technical and psychosocial indicators to be used in testing the AI-InCyThR
proof-of-concept prototype. The AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype was intended to
be a means of identifying precursors to malicious cybersecurity insider threat attacks by
alerting cybersecurity engineers and managers when certain user activity has exceeded a
stated minimum security baseline.
This chapter also discussed the methods with which to address specific research
goals and specific research questions. The collection of technical and psychosocial
indicators was developed using a literature review, in addition to the feedback received
from an expert panel. Moreover, this chapter examined data reliability and validity, data
collection procedures, data analysis processes, resources, and the simulated user activity
data set.
This chapter outlined a multi-step, three-phased approach towards developing the
AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype. After establishing the list of technical and
psychosocial indicators derived from the literature, Phase 1 of Delphi method data
collection from SMEs proposed and validated the indicators. Step 2 of Phase 1 again
relied on the SMEs, now to assign weighted value to the already validated indicators. In
Phase 2, the validated and weighted indicators were applied to the AI-InCyThR proof-ofconcept prototype and correlated to user activity in comparison to the defined minimumsecurity baseline, refining the findings and identifying any false positives or false
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negatives seen in the data. During Phase 3, analysis of the evidence collected and
correlations were hierarchically bundled for visualization, and analyzed for overall
detection accuracy.
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Chapter 4
Results
Overview
The main goal of this research study was to design, develop, and validate a proofof-concept prototype for a malicious cybersecurity insider threat alerting system that will
assist in the detection and prediction of malicious insider threat activity using humancentric technical activities, as well as, individual employee psychometric rating scales.
The previous chapters have introduced the topic, problem, theoretical foundation, and
methodology of this study. Chapter 4 will present the results of this study. In Phase 1, the
results of two Delphi surveys used to validate indicators, indicator categories, and
indicator weights based on an expert panel of SMEs will be presented. In phase two,
results of data analysis of a simulated employee activity data set will be presented. Phase
three consists of continued analysis of the simulated dataset and comparison to SME
opinion.
The main research question this study addressed is: What human-centric technical
activity and psychometric indicators are precursors to malicious end-user activity,
making those activities rise above a certain threshold to be identified as potential insider
threats? The specific research questions (RQ) this study addressed are:
RQ1: What are the important cybersecurity indicators validated by the expert
panel that can assist in the detection of insider threat activity?
RQ2: What are the expert-validated cybersecurity indicator categories?
RQ3: What are the expert-approved weights for the identified cybersecurity
indicators?

123
RQ4: What are the expert-identified most significant correlations between
cybersecurity indicators?
RQ5a: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to
have a high rate of false positives as measured by the AI-InCyThR prototype?
RQ5b: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to
have a high rate of false negatives as measured by the AI-InCyThR prototype?
RQ6: What simulated user activity indicators were identified by the AI-InCyThR
proof-of-concept prototype as significant indicators to identify insider threat activity?
RQ7: How are the simulated user activity correlations that were identified by the
SMEs different than those identified by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as
significant to identify insider threat activity?

Phase 1 - Expert Panel
Data collection in Phase 1 occurred from April 2018 to May 2018 using two
Delphi technique survey instruments to collect data from an expert panel. The expert
panel consisted of SMEs in the field of cybersecurity and information technology with
cybersecurity responsibilities. The goal of this phase was to collect data to validate
indicators, indicator categories, and assign indicator weights and correlations. To address
RQ1, SMEs were asked to rank user activity indicators on a seven-point Likert scale
ranging from (1) not at all important to 7 (extremely important). The top 10 average
highest ranked indicators were chosen as the SME validated indicators. To address RQ2,
SMEs were also asked to rank indicator categories in a similar manner. In a second
Delphi survey, SMEs were asked to identify what they deemed as important correlations
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between indicators as well as assign a weight to the indicators. Data from this survey was
used to address RQ3 and RQ4.
Phase 1, Delphi 1 – Data Collection
During Phase 1 of this study, the goal of the SMEs was to identify the most
important cybersecurity indicators used to detect the malicious cybersecurity insider
threats. Indicators and indicator categories were derived from literature and presented in
Chapter 2. The final instrument used for Phase 1 is presented in Appendix C. The SMEs
consisted of over 336 cybersecurity and IT professionals with cyber security
responsibilities. Individuals in academia and public and private sectors were sourced
from LinkedIn social network, all residing in the U.S. SME selection criteria was outlined
in Chapter 3. To record the SMEs responses, an email (presented in Appendix C) was
sent to the SMEs. This email contained a link to the Web-based survey tool. A total of 46
SMEs completed the Phase 1 survey. No additional rounds of data collection were
necessary as qualitative data did not indicate SME desire to add or remove the indicators
presented.
Phase 1 – Pre-Analysis Data Screening
Pre-analysis data screening was performed on data collected from the SMEs. Data
screening is an important step to ensure accuracy in the data collected as well as to
confirm there are no extreme or missing values (Levy & Ellis, 2006; Mertler & Vannatta,
2005). The SMEs responses were collected by way of the SurveyMonkey® Web-based
tool, which ensures completeness by impeding incomplete survey submissions. This
resulted in none of the surveys submitted being excluded. Through the pre-analysis data
screening, no outliers were identified or excluded. Thus, all 46 responses collected were
complete and included in the data analysis procedures.
Phase 1, Delphi 1 – Expert Panel Characteristics
There were 46 SMEs who participated in the Delphi 1 survey. The majority of
these SMEs were male (n = 32, 70%). The largest proportion of SMEs were in the 35-44
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age category (n = 20, 43%). Slightly more than a third of the SMEs held an IT MS (n =
16, 35%). The largest proportion of SMEs were Security Analyst Engineers (n = 11,
24%). Half of the SMEs worked in either local, state, or federal government (n = 23,
50%). Of those who did not choose one of the offered industry choices and wrote in their
answer, industries were: government contractor, non-profit, and technology subject
matter expert -issues, opportunities and threats active security clearance, each with an
observed frequency of one. The full frequencies and percentages of the SME
demographics are presented in Table 30.
Table 30
Frequency Table for SME Demographics
Variable

n

%

Gender
Female

14 30.43

Male

32 69.57

Age
25-34

5 10.87

35-44

20 43.48

45-54

13 28.26

55-64

7 15.22

65-74

1

2.17

High School Diploma

1

2.17

Bachelor’s degree

9 19.57

MBA

7 15.22

OJT

6 13.04

PhD

4

8.70

Professional Doctorate

3

6.52

Education
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Table 30
Frequency Table for SME Demographics
Variable

n

%

Role
Academia Researcher

7 15.22

CIO/CISO/CEO/CFO/COO

5 10.87

Cybersecurity Program Management

6 13.04

Security Analyst Engineer

11 23.91

Security Operations Manager

3

6.52

Technical Analyst Engineer

5 10.87

Technical Lead IT Professional

9 19.57

Industry
Education

7 15.22

Financial Banking

2

4.35

Healthcare

3

6.52

Local State Federal Government

23 50.00

Other please specify

3

6.52

Private Industry/Commercial

8 17.39

Industry—Other (write-in responses)
Government contractor

1

2.17

Non-profit

1

2.17

Technology SME with ACTIVE Security Clearance

1

2.17

No Answer

43 93.48

Note. Due to rounding errors, percentages may not equal 100%.

Phase 1, Delphi 1 – Data Analysis
In Phase 1, Delphi 1, the data collected via the SurveyMonkeyâ survey tool was
exported to Microsoft Excel for initial analysis and processing. The SME responses to
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RQ1 and RQ2 were parsed to identify the count for each indicator and indicator category.
To address RQ1, what are the important cybersecurity indicators validated by the expert
panel that can assist in the detection of insider threat activity? SMEs were asked to rank
cybersecurity indicators in order of importance using a seven-point Likert scale ranging
from (1) not at all important to (7) extremely important. The most important
cybersecurity indicators validated by the expert panel were identified by ranking the top
ten items by average score. From most important to least important the top ten most
important cybersecurity indicators were LG1, LG2, LG3, MC1, HT6, EM8, EM7, EM6,
EM5, and PS2A. Table 31 presents means and standard deviations of the importance of
these indicators as well as a description of each indicator.
Table 31
Means and Standard Deviations of Importance of Indicators
Indicator
Number
LG1
LG3
LG2
EM8

Indicator Description
Employee logs on to different PC’s without proper
authorization
Employee logs on after hours more than 30% of the
tenure days without proper authorization
Employee logs on after-hours more than 30% of the
time (9 out or 30 days) without proper authorization
Employee sends an external email with risky words
identified in the organizational word content filtering
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30
days)

Importance
M
6.2

SD
0.88

6.1

1.01

6.0

1.26

6.0

1.19
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Table 31
Means and Standard Deviations of Importance of Indicators (Cont.)
Indicator
Number
HT6

EM7

EM5

PS2A
EM6

MC1

Indicator Description
Employee visits an eternal HTTP site with risky words
identified in the organizational word content filtering
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30
days)
Employee receives an external email with risky word
identified in the organizational word content filtering
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30
days)
Employee sends an internal email with risky words
identified in the organizational word content filtering
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30
days)
Low score on conscientiousness: The employee is
impulsive, careless, disorganized
Employee receives an internal email with risky words
identified in the organizational word content filtering
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30
days).
Employee connects a removable media device to an
organizational PC

Importance
M
5.8

SD
1.05

5.7

1.38

5.5

1.46

5.5

1.52

5.4

1.49

5.3

1.46

To address RQ2. what are the expert-validated cybersecurity indicator categories?
SMEs were asked to rank the importance of indicator categories on a scale of (1) not
important to (7) very important. Table 32 presents the mean importance rating of the top
10 most highly rated indicator categories. Indicator categories identified as most
important included technical (unauthorized logon activity, removable media device file
activity, and removable media device connection activity, HTTP/online activity, email
activity) and psychometric (neuroticism, conscientiousness, openness, agreeableness,
extroversion). The most important category rated was technical: unauthorized logon
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activity. The lowest ranked most important category was psychometric: extroversion.
Although each of the indicators from these categories were considered important, the
majority of indicators individually identified as important were regarding email activity
and logon activity.
Table 32
Means and Standard Deviations of Importance of Indicator Categories
Indicator Category
Technical
Technical
Technical
Psychometric
Technical
Technical
Psychometric:
Psychometric:
Psychometric:
Psychometric:

Importance
Unauthorized Logon
Activity
Removable Media Device
File Activity (Open, Write,
Copy, Delete) Activity
Removable Media Device
Connection Activity
Neuroticism
HTTP/Online Activity
Email Activity
Conscientiousness
Openness
Agreeableness
Extroversion

M
6.4

SD
0.91

5.6

1.29

5.4

1.26

5.1
4.9
4.8
4.7
4.4
4.4
4.2

1.21
1.39
1.33
1.48
1.45
1.34
1.37

Phase 1, Delphi 2 – Data Collection
Over a two-week period, the Phase 1, Delphi 2 survey instrument was sent to the
336 previously identified SMEs and collected 26 responses for an 8% response rate. The
SMEs were asked to assign a weight to the indicators as well as identify what they
deemed as important correlations between indicators. Data from this survey was used to
address RQ3 and RQ4.
Phase 1, Delphi 2 – Pre-Analysis
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Pre-analysis data screening did not identify any qualitative SME responses that
suggested that indicators needed to be added or removed. The survey was set up to now
allow incomplete responses. As such, no incomplete responses were collected.
Phase 1, Delphi 2 – Data Analysis
As previously mentioned, the most important cybersecurity indicators validated
by the expert panel were identified by ranking the top ten items by average score. From
most important to least important the top ten most important cybersecurity indicators
were LG1, LG2, LG3, MC1, HT6, EM8, EM7, EM6, EM5, and PS2A. To address RQ3,
what are the expert-approved weights for the identified cybersecurity indicators? SMEs
were asked to assign the top 10 indicators weights based on a scale of 1 to 100. The most
highly weighted indicator, on average, was LG3 (M = 81.2; SD = 17.3). The lowest
weighted indicator was EM7 (M = 59.5, SD = 2.78). Table 33 presents the means and
standard deviations of these indicator weights.
Table 33
Means and Standard Deviations of Importance of Indicator Weights
Indicator
Number
LG3
PS2A
LG1
EM6

Indicator Description
Employee logs on after hours more than 30% of the
tenure days without proper authorization
Low score on conscientiousness: The employee is
impulsive, careless, disorganized
Employee logs on to different PC’s without proper
authorization
Employee receives an internal email with risky words
identified in the organizational word content filtering
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30
days)

Weight
M
81.2

SD
17.3

78.6

21.7

78.3

16.2

77.1

21.3
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Table 33
Means and Standard Deviations of Importance of Indicator Weights (Cont.)
Indicator
Number
MC1
LG2
EM8

HT6

EM5

EM7

Indicator Description
Employee connects a removable media device to an
organizational PC
Employee logs on after-hours more than 30% of the
time (9 out or 30 days) without proper authorization
Employee sends an external email with risky words
identified in the organizational word content filtering
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30
days)
Employee visits an eternal HTTP site with risky words
identified in the organizational word content filtering
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30
days)
Employee sends an internal email with risky words
identified in the organizational word content filtering
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30
days)
Employee receives an external email with risky word
identified in the organizational word content filtering
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30
days)

Weight
M
75.7

SD
20.9

73.0

18.4

70.0

24.5

67.9

24.2

61.6

26.5

59.5

27.8

To address RQ4, what are the expert-identified most significant correlations
between cybersecurity indicators? SMEs were asked to choose important correlations
between indicators. The top 10 most frequently identified pairings were retained as
significant correlations. Pairings with frequencies less than three were excluded. These
results are presented in Table 34.
For correlation number 1, the most frequently identified pairing was between HT5
and HT4. For correlation number 2, the most frequently identified pairing was between
EM8 and EM7. For correlation number 3, the most frequently identified pairing was
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between HT3 and HT5. For correlation number 4, the most frequently identified pairing
was between PS4A and LG3. For correlation number 5, the most frequently identified
pairing was between EM8 and EM5. For correlation number 6, the most frequently
identified pairing was between HT2 and HT3. For correlation number 7, the most
frequently identified pairing was between LG2 and LG3. For correlation number 8, the
most frequently identified pairing was between MF3 and HT3. For correlation number 9,
the most frequently identified pairing was between PS5A and PS5. For correlation
number 10, the most frequently identified pairing was between PS5B and EM8.
Table 34
SME-Identified Correlations
Correlation #

Indicator 1

Indicator 2

Frequency Identified

1

HT5

HT4

5

2

EM8

EM7

4

3

HT3

HT5

4

4

PS4A

LG3

4

5

EM8

EM5

3

6

HT2

HT3

3

7

LG2

LG3

3

8

MF3

HT2

3

9

PS5A

PS5

3

10

PS5B

EM8

3

Phases Two and Three-Analysis of Simulated User Activity
Data analysis for phases two and three occurred from June 2018 to October 2018
using a simulated user activity dataset. The goal of this phase was to analyze data
representing simulated user activity that may or may not be malicious. To address RQ5a
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and RQ5b, cross-tabulations were created between the indicator categories identified by
the SMEs as well as identified by the system to determine the number of false positives
and false negatives. To address RQ6, bivariate binary logistic regressions were used to
determine what the system as identified as significant predictors of malicious activity, as
well as, which of the SME-validated indicators were significantly predictive of malicious
activity. To address RQ7, the SME rankings of indicator importance were compared to
results of binary logistic regressions.
Phases Two and Three– Data Collection
As noted by Lindauer et al. (2013), while insider threat research is of paramount
importance, one of the greatest challenges in this field of research is obtaining suitable
data for research, testing, and development. This is due to the fact that insiders are
employees of the organization; in order to collect user activity data, organizations must
monitor, record, and analyze the behaviors and actions of their own employees. This type
of real time employee monitoring raises confidentiality and privacy concerns, making it
preferable for researchers to use synthetic data (Glasser & Lindauer, 2013).
The simulated user activity dataset analyzed for this study was obtained from
Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute, CERT National Insider
Threat Center. The simulated data represents an aggregated “collection of logs from hostbased sensors distributed across all the computer workstations within a large business or
government organization over a 500-day period” (Glasser & Lindauer, 2013, p. 1).
Phases Two and Three – Pre-Analysis Data Screening
Pre-analysis data screening was used to determine that the data set consisted of
115 million lines of simulated user activity. Simulated user activities ranged from
logon/logoff behavior, email patterns, HTTP visits, external media/USB usage, file
copies or changes, attempted restricted file access, demographics, and psychometric scale
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ratings. All but one of the indicator categories presented to the SMEs produced
reasonable odds ratios and were used in the data analysis of this study. The indicator
Decoy File category presented two indicators DF1 and DF2 as seen in Table 33. For DF1,
the simulated dataset lacked the employee to PC relationship needed to analyze this
indicator. DF2 produced a high false positive rate indicating that 90.07% of PC’s
produced this activity. As a result, these indicators were dropped from the study and were
replaces with EM6 and MC1, the indicators with the next highest mean in the SME
identified order of importance. After data screening, the final dataset consisted of 4118
simulated users, with 118 of those users known malicious insider threat actors.
Table 35
Decoy File Indicators
Indicator
Number

Indicator Description

Frequency
0

DF1
DF2

An employee accesses a decoy file or honeypot without NA
proper authorization
A PC accesses a decoy file or honeypot without proper 409
authorization

1
NA
3708

Phase Two and Three—Data Analysis
Research Questions 5a and 5b
RQ5a: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to
have a high rate of false positives as measured by the AI-InCyThR prototype?
RQ5b: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to
have a high rate of false negatives as measured by the AI-InCyThR prototype?
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To address this research question, crosstabulations of the categories of each
indicator variable (categories: yes, performed activity; no, did not perform activity)
identified by the system and the variable malicious user (yes, flagged as actual malicious
user; no, not actual malicious user) were generated. Then, the percentages of users who
were malicious users and did perform the indicator activity were compared to the
percentages of users who were malicious users and did not perform the activity. Table 34
presents the results of these crosstabulations.
For LG4, almost all malicious users did not perform this activity (99.19%).
Similarly, only 2.70% of non-malicious users performed this activity. For MC4, almost
all non-malicious users did not perform this activity (97.58%). A fair amount of nonmalicious users did perform this activity (19.03%). For MF4, all malicious users did not
perform this activity (100%). Similarly, only 2.60% of non-malicious users performed
this activity. For EM2, almost all non-malicious users did not perform this activity
(99.19%). Of the non-malicious users, 5.03% performed this activity. For EM9, the
majority of non-malicious users did not perform this activity (96.77%), and the majority
of non-malicious users did perform the activity (82.29%). For HT7, the majority of
malicious users did not perform this activity (96.77%), and a small amount of nonmalicious users did perform this activity (15.25%). For PS1B, three-quarters of malicious
users did not perform this activity, while just under a third of non-malicious users did
perform this activity (29.03%). For PS3B, a majority of malicious users did not perform
this activity (76.61%), and 26.60% of non-malicious users performed this activity. For
PS4B, 71.77% of malicious users did not perform this activity, while 25.64% of non-
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malicious users did perform this activity. For PS5B, 73.39% of malicious users did not
perform this activity, while 27.97% of non-malicious users did perform this activity.
For the system identified indicators, the majority of indicators had a high rate of
false negatives (ranging from 71.77% to 100%). EM9 had the highest rate of false
positives. LG4 and MF4 had the lowest rate of false positives.
Table 36
Crosstabulation Between System-Identified Indicator Activity and Malicious User
Indicator
LG4
No
Yes
MC4
No
Yes
MF4
No
Yes
EM2
No
Yes
EM9
No
Yes
HT7
No
Yes
PS1B
No
Yes

Malicious User
No (n, sample %; column
Yes (n, sample %;
%)
column %)
3885 (94.36%; 97.305)
108 (2.62%; 2.70%)

123 (2.99%; 99.19%)
1 (0.02%; 0.81%)

3233 (78.53%; 80.97%)
760 (18.46%; 19.03%)

121 (2.94%; 97.58%)
3 (0.07% ; 2.42%)

3889 (94.46%; 97.40%)
104 (2.53%; 2.60%)

124 (3.01%; 100%)
0 (0.00%; 0.00%)

3792 (92.11%; 94.97%)
201 (4.88%; 5.03%)

123 (2.99%; 99.19%)
1 (0.02%; 0.81%)

707 (17.17%; 17.71%)
3286 (79.82%; 82.29%)

120 (2.91%; 96.77%)
4 (0.10%;
3.23%)

3384 (82.20%; 84.75%)
609 (14.79; 15.25%)

120 (2.91%; 96.77%)
4 (0.10%; 3.23%)

2834 (68.84%; 70.97%)
1159 (28.15; 29.03%)

93 (2.26%; 75.00%)
31 (0.75%; 25.00%)

137
Table 36
Crosstabulation Between System-Identified Indicator Activity and Malicious User (Cont.)
Indicator
Malicious User
No (n, sample %; column
Yes (n, sample %;
%)
column %)
PS3B
No
2923 (71.00; 73.20%)
95 (2.31%; 76.61%)
Yes
1070 (25.99%; 26.80%)
29 (0.70%; 23.39%)
PS4B
No
2969 (72.12%; 74.36%)
89 (2.16%; 71.77%)
Yes
1024 (24.87%; 25.64%)
35 (0.85%; 28.23)
PS5B
No
2876 (69.86%; 72.03%)
91 (2.21%; 73.39%)
Yes
1117 (27.13%; 27.97%)
33 (0.80%; 26.61%)
Next, crosstabulations of the categories of each indicator variable identified by the
SMEs and the variable malicious user were generated. Table 37 presents the frequencies
and percentages associated with these crosstabulations. For LG1, the majority of
malicious users did not perform the activity (71.77%). Of the non-malicious users,
29.18% did perform this activity. For LG2, the majority of malicious users did perform
the activity (84.68%). Less than a quarter of non-malicious users performed this activity
(22.11%). For LG3, the majority of malicious users did not perform the activity
(52.42%). Only 2.48% of non-malicious users performed this activity.
For MC1, almost all malicious users did not perform the activity (96.77%). Less
than a quarter of non-malicious users did perform this activity (19.61%). For HT6, the
majority of malicious users did not perform the activity (97.58%). No non-malicious user
performed this activity (0.00%). For EM8, the majority of malicious users did not
perform the activity (98.39%). A sizeable amount of non-malicious users performed this
activity (41.97%). For EM7, the majority of malicious users did not perform the activity
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(97.58%). The majority of non-malicious performed this activity (64.01%). For EM6,
almost all malicious users did not perform the activity (99.19%). Slightly less than half of
non-malicious users performed this activity (48.79%). For EM5, almost all malicious
users did not perform the activity (99.19%). Almost a third of non-malicious users
performed this activity (30.15%). For PS2A, the majority of malicious users did not
perform the activity (70.16%). Less than a third of non-malicious users performed this
activity (27.62%).
Out of the ten indicators, only LG2 correctly identified the malicious user the
majority of the time (84.68%). The indicator that correctly identified the malicious user
the next highest majority of the time was LG3, at 47.58%. Almost all other indicators had
a very high percentage of false negatives. EM8, EM7, and EM6 had the highest
percentages of false positives, with 41.96-64.01% of non-malicious users having
performed the activity.
Table 37
Crosstabulation Between SME-Identified Indicator Activity and Malicious User
Indicator
LG1
No
Yes
LG2
No
Yes
LG3
No
Yes

Malicious User
No (n, sample %; column
Yes (n, sample %; column
%)
%)
2828 (68.69%; 70.82%)
1165 (28.30%; 29.18%)

89 (2.16%; 71.77%))
35 (2.92%; 28.23%)

3110 (75.54%;77.89%)
883 (21.45%; 22.11%)

19 (0.46%; 15.32%)
105 (2.55%; 84.68%)

3894 (94.58%; 97.52%)
99 (2.40%; 2.48%)

65 (1.58%; 52.42%)
59 (1.43%; 47.58%)
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Table 37
Crosstabulation Between SME-Identified Indicator Activity and Malicious User (Cont.)
Indicator
MC1
No
Yes
HT6
No
Yes
EM8
No
Yes
EM7
No
Yes
EM6
No
Yes
EM5
No
Yes
PS2A
No
Yes

Malicious User
No (n, sample %; column
Yes (n, sample %; column
%)
%)
3210 (77.97%; 80.39%)
783 (19.02%; 19.61%)

120 (2.91%; 96.77%)
4 (0.10%; 3.23%)

3993 (96.99%; 100%)
0 (0.00%; 0.00%)

121 (2.94%; 97.58%)
3 (0.07%; 2.42%)

2317 (56.28%; 58.03%)
1676 (40.71%; 41.97%)

122 (2.96%; 98.39%)
2 (0.05%; 1.61%)

1437 (34.90%; 35.99%)
2556 (62.08%; 64.01%)

121 (2.94%; 97.58%)
3 (0.07%; 2.42%)

2045 (49.67%; 51.21%)
1948 (47.32%; 48.79%)

123 (2.99%; 99.19%)
1 (0.02%; 0.81%)

2789 (67.74%; 69.85%)
1204 (29.24%; 30.15%)

123 (2.99%; 99.19%)
1 (0.02%; 0.81%)

2890 (70.20%; 72.38%)
1103 (26.79%; 27.62%)

87 (2.11%; 70.16%)
37 (0.90%; 29.84%)

Research Question 6
RQ6: What simulated user activity indicators were identified by the AI-InCyThR
proof-of-concept prototype as significant indicators to identify insider threat activity?
To address this research question, a series of bivariate binary logistic regressions
were performed. The binary dependent variable for each regression was malicious user (1
= yes, flagged as actual malicious user, 0 = no, not actual malicious user). The predictor
variables were user activity indicators (1 = yes, performed activity, 0 = no, did not
perform activity) identified by the system, as well indicators identified by the SMEs.
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Then, a multivariate model was specified which included all indicators identified by the
SMEs in one model.
The bivariate models involving indicators identified by the system are
summarized in Table 38. EM9 was a significant predictor of being a malicious user, OR
= 0.01, p < .001. The odds of being a malicious user are 0.01 times lower for users who
perform this activity when compared to users who do not perform this activity. HT7 was
a significant predictor of being a malicious user, OR = 0.19, p = .001. The odds of being
a malicious user were 0.19 times lower for users who performed this activity when
compared to those who do not perform this activity. No other indicator was a significant
predictor.
Table 38
Results of Bivariate Binary Logistic Regression with System-Identified Indicators
Predicting Likelihood of Malicious User
Indicator
B
SE
OR
p
MC4
-1.23
1.01
0.29
.223
-14.05
625.2 < .001
.982
MF4
-1.87
1.01
.015
.063
EM2
-4.94
0.51
0.01
< .001***
EM9
HT7
-1.69
0.51
0.19
.001**
-0.20
0.21
0.82
.331
PS1B
-0.18
0.22
0.83
.399
PS3B
0.13
0.21
1.14
.518
PS4B
PS5B
-0.07
0.21
0.93
.739
* p < 0.05, ** p.< 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The bivariate models involving indicators identified by the SMEs are summarized
in Table 39. All indicators were significantly predictive of likelihood of being a malicious
user to various amounts except for LG1, HT6, and PS2A. HT6 showed greatly inflated
estimates, indicating that results should be treated with caution. Performance of Lg2 and
LG3 were predictive of increased chances of being a malicious user, while performance
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of the other significant predictors were indicative of a decreased chance of being a
malicious user.
Table 39
Results of Bivariate Binary Logistic Regression with SME-Identified Indicators
Predicting Likelihood of Malicious User
Indicator
B
SE
OR
p
LG1
-0.05
0.21
0.96
.819
LG2
2.97
0.25
19.46
< .001***
LG3
3.57
0.21
35.70
< .001***
MC1
-1.99
0.51
0.14
< .001***
HT6
34.23
2718231
> 999.99
1.00
EM8
-3.79
0.71
0.02
< .001***
EM7
-4.27
0.58
0.01
< .001***
EM6
-4.76
1.00
0.01
< .001***
EM5
-3.97
1.00
0.02
< .001***
PS2A
0.11
0.20
1.11
.587
* p < 0.05, ** p.< 0.01, *** p < 0.001

A multivariate model was then specified with each of the SME-identified
indicators. First, multicollinearity between the predictor variables was assessed using
tetrachoric correlations. Correlations were considered strong if they were .80 or above
and significant (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). HT6 had a strong correlation with almost all
predictors. There was a strong correlation between LG1 and LG2 (0.84, p < .001). There
was a strong correlation between LG2 and LG3 (0.99, p < .001) and HT6 (1.00, p =
.003). As such, HT6 and LG2 were removed from the model because there was
collinearity with other indicators in the model.
The overall regression model was significant, !2(9) = 688.73, p < .001. This
indicates that at least one of the indicators significantly predicts the likelihood of a user
being classified as malicious. As such, the individual indicators were examined. The
results of the binary logistic regression are summarized in Table 38.
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LG1 was a significant predictor of malicious users, odds ratio (OR) = 2.74, p
<.001. This indicates that the odds of being a malicious user are 2.74 times higher if the
user performs this activity when compared to users who do not perform this activity. LG3
was a significant predictor of malicious users, OR = 58.97, p < .001. The odds of being a
malicious user are 58.97 times higher if the user performs this activity. MC1 was a
significant predictor of malicious users, OR = 0.10, p < .001. This indicates that those
who performed this activity had 0.10 times lower odds of being a malicious user. EM8
was a significant predictor of malicious users, OR = 0.06, p = .001. Those who performed
this activity had 0.06 lower odds of being a malicious user. EM7 was a significant
predictor of malicious users, OR = 0.01, p < .001. Those who performed this activity had
0.01 times lower odds of being a malicious user. EM6 was a significant predictor of
malicious users, OR = 0.02, p < .001. Those who performed this activity had 0.02 times
lower odds of being a malicious user. EM5 and PS2A did not significantly predict
changes in the likelihood of being a malicious user.
Table 40
Multivariate Binary Logistic Regression with Indicators Predicting Likelihood of
Malicious User
Indicator
B
SE
OR
p
Intercept
-2.53
0.18
< .001***
LG1
1.01
0.27
2.74
< .001***
LG3
4.08
0.34
58.97
< .001***
MC1
-2.30
0.59
0.10
< .001***
EM8
-2.83
0.81
0.06
< .001***
EM7
-4.76
0.69
0.01
< .001***
EM6
-3.82
1.07
0.02
< .001***
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Table 40
Multivariate Binary Logistic Regression with Indicators Predicting Likelihood of
Malicious User (Cont.)
Indicator
B
SE
OR
p
EM5
-1.97
1.02
0.14
.054
PS2A
0.19
0.26
1.21
.454
* p < 0.05, ** p.< 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Research Question 7
RQ7: How are the simulated user activity correlations that were identified by the
SMEs different than those identified by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as
significant to identify insider threat activity?
To address this research question, the average importance of each SME-identified
indicator was compared towards their actual significance and OR as reported by bivariate
logistic regressions (see Table 37 for the bivariate logistic regressions). Table 39 presents
the SME rankings and the ORs and actual significance.
On average, SMEs ranked LG1 the highest in importance. However, when
assessed statistically, this was not an actual significant predictor of malicious users. LG3
was ranked the second highest in importance. When assessed statistically, this was a
significant predictor with a high OR. LG2 was ranked third. When assessed statistically,
this was a significant predictor with a high OR that was below the OR of LG3. EM8 was
ranked fourth. This was a significant predictor with a very small OR, indicating that the
activity predicts lower odds of being a malicious user. HT6 showed inflated estimates,
indicating that results were not reliable, and thus was not reported here. EM 7 was ranked
sixth. This was a significant predictor with an OR similar to EM8, indicating lower odds
of being a malicious user. EM5 was ranked seventh. This was a significant predictor with
a OR similar to EM8 and EM7, indicating lower odds of being a malicious user. PS2A
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was ranked eighth. This was not a significant predictor. EM6 was ranked ninth, this was a
significant predictor with a small OR, indicating lower odds of being a malicious user.
Finally, MC1 was ranked 10th most important. This was a significant predictor with a low
OR, indicating lower odds of being a malicious user.
Table 41
Indicator SME-Identified Average Importance, OR, and Significance of Indicators
Indicator
Number
LG1
LG3
LG2

EM8

HT6†

EM7

Indicator Description
Employee logs on to different
PC’s without proper authorization
Employee logs on after hours
more than 30% of the tenure days
without proper authorization
Employee logs on after-hours
more than 30% of the time (9 out
or 30 days) without proper
authorization
Employee sends an external email
with risky words identified in the
organizational word content
filtering technology more than
30% of the time (9 out or 30
days)
Employee visits an eternal HTTP
site with risky words identified in
the organizational word content
filtering technology more than
30% of the time (9 out or 30
days)
Employee receives an external
email with risky word identified
in the organizational word
content filtering technology more
than 30% of the time (9 out or 30
days)

Importance

OR

p

M

SD

6.2

0.88

0.96

.819

6.1

1.01

35.70

< .001***

6.0

1.26

19.46

< .001***

6.0

1.19

0.02

< .001***

5.8

1.05

-

-

5.7

1.38

0.01

< .001***
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Table 41
Indicator SME-Identified Average Importance, OR, and Significance of Indicators
(Cont.)
Indicator
Indicator Description
Importance
OR
p
Number
M
SD
EM5

Employee sends an internal email
with risky words identified in the
organizational word content
filtering technology more than
30% of the time (9 out or 30
days)
Low score on conscientiousness:
The employee is impulsive,
careless, disorganized
Employee receives an internal
email with risky words identified
in the organizational word
content filtering technology more
than 30% of the time (9 out or 30
days).
Employee connects a removable
media device to an organizational
PC

PS2A
EM6

MC1

5.5

1.46

0.02

<.001***

5.5

1.52

1.11

.587

5.4

1.49

0.01

< .001***

5.3

1.46

0.14

< .001***

†Estimates for this indicator not reliable and are thus not reported, * p < 0.05, ** p.< 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Summary
For Research Question 1, SMEs identified the following ten indicators as being
the most important: LG1, LG2, LG3, MC1, HT6, EM8, EM7, EM6, EM5, and PS2A. For
Research Question 2, the validated indicator categories were technical (unauthorized
logon activity, removable media device file activity [open, write, copy, delete] activity,
removable media device connection activity, HTTP/online activity, email activity) and
psychometric (conscientiousness, openness, neuroticism, agreeableness, extroversion).
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For Research Question 4, the most frequently identified top-ranked correlation was
between HT5 and HT4.
For Research Question 5, all but LG2 had high percentages of false negatives in
the SME-identified indicators. EM8, EM7, and EM6 had the highest percentages of false
positives in the SME-identified indicators. For the system identified indicators, EM9 had
the highest rate of false positives. LG4 and MF4 had the lowest rate of false positives.
For Research Question 6, when considered in bivariate models, the EM9 was the only
system-identified indicator that was significantly predictive of odds of being a malicious
user. Performance of this indicator activity was associated with lower odds of being a
malicious user. When considered in bivariate models, the following SME-identified
indicators were significantly predictive of higher odds of being a malicious user: LG2,
LG3, and EM6. The following SME-identified indicators were significantly predictive of
lower odds of being a malicious user: MC1, EM8, EM6, and EM5. For Research
Question 7, the SME-identified most important rankings were confirmed by bivariate
logistic regression results for LG3 and LG2 but were not confirmed for most other
indicators.
The following chapter will discuss these results in more detail. The strengths and
limitations of the study will be examined. Recommendations for future research will be
given.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary
Conclusions
Over a 12 month period, the estimated average cost of an insider threat attack is
$8.76 million (Ponemon, 2018). Insider threat attack continues to be one of today’s most
challenging cybersecurity issues that is not well addressed by commonly implemented
cybersecurity measures (Homoliak, Toffalini, Guarnizo, & Elovici, 2018). Therefore, the
main goal of this proposed research study was to design, develop, and validate a proof-ofconcept prototype for a malicious cybersecurity insider threat alerting system that will
assist in the detection and prediction of malicious insider threat activity using humancentric technical activities, as well as, individual employee psychometric rating scales.
This process was conducted by developing the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype
using SME validated technical and psychometric cybersecurity indicators. This study
achieved the seven goals by using a three-phased approach. First, using the Delphi
method, an expert panel of SMEs validated the most important technical and
psychometric cybersecurity indicators that should be used in the detection of malicious
cybersecurity insider threat, as well as, rank the cybersecurity indicator categories.
Second, using the Delphi method, the previously validated indicator categories were
assigned weights and order of importance by the SMEs, and the SMEs identified their
preferred top 10 indicator correlations. Finally, the previously validated and weighted
indicators were operationalized, and the AI-InCYThR proof-of-concept prototype was
used to measure the accuracy of the top 10 SMEs identified cybersecurity indicators.
Discussion
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Principally, the results of the study validated the top 10 cybersecurity indicators
important in the detection of malicious cybersecurity insider threat: LG1, LG2, LG3,
MC1, HT6, EM8, EM7, EM6, EM5, and PS2. These results indicate that cybersecurity
practitioners should begin to focus on the detection of anomalies within these areas of
user activity and personality factors. The results also indicated that LG1 was a significant
predictor of malicious users, where the odds of being a malicious user are 2.74 times
higher if the user performs this activity when compared to users who do not perform this
activity. The results of this study identified that the most important correlation between
user activities are those related to user Internet usage as determined by SMEs
identification of when an employee downloads a file from an external HTTP site (HT4),
and when an employee downloads a file from an external HTTP site more than 3 times in
one day (HT5). This suggests that cybersecurity practitioners should focus on, and tune
their monitoring solutions to identify logon policy violations and any violations of the
acceptable Internet usage and file download policy within the organization.
Overall, AI-InCyThR was not implied to be effective in comparison to the SMEs
overall importance ranking of the cybersecurity indicators used in the detection of
malicious cybersecurity insider threats. However, each of the validated indicators were
found to be effective in the detection of malicious insider threat activity. Observed
effectiveness was implied for the following items: indicator correlations, indicators
presented, and relevance of the indicator to malicious insider threat detection. Observed
effectiveness was not implied for the following items: organization of the indicators
presented, complexity of the indicators presented, ability to effectively identify potential
malicious insider threat, ability to make actionable decisions based on the data presented.
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A possibly inconsequential limitation of this study is the use of simulated data. Another
possible limitation of this study was the analysis of key words and the fine tuning of the
key words within the AI-InCyThR system. In the real world, cybersecurity practitioners
have the ability to easily fine tune their monitoring solutions based on organizational
policy and real-time threats as they arise.

Implications
The implications of this research study in relation to the existing body of
knowledge are the contributions to IS and InfoSec. This study developed and validated a
set of cybersecurity indicators for the detection of malicious cybersecurity insider threat
activities. One of the major challenges in cybersecurity is the human-centric factor.
Because of human nature, some employees won’t adhere to acceptable use policies,
contributing to cybercrime in ways such as opening attachments containing malware, or
using easy to guess passwords, in addition to, an employee leaving and either steals
information or compromises systems (Grossbart, 2018).
This study identified SME validated technical and psychometric cybersecurity
indicators, how the indicators correlate with each other, as well as, validated indicator
effectiveness in the detection of malicious cybersecurity insider threats. This study
provides organizations with a set of technical and psychometric indicators that are
perceived as effective in the detection of malicious cybersecurity insider threat activities.
This set of cybersecurity indicators could assist organizations in the detection and
mitigation of malicious cybersecurity insider threat activities.
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Recommendations and Future Research
This study was a developmental research and delineated the research approach to
employing the Delphi technique to validate and measure cybersecurity indicators, as well
as, construct a proof-of-concept prototype to apply the cybersecurity indicators to be used
by organizations in the detection of malicious cybersecurity insider threat. The approach
illustrated in this research study can be implemented by other fields of study to propose
and validate indicators for use in other specialties. Furthermore, this approach can be
conveyable to other fields of study were a proof-of-concept prototype needs to be
developed.
This research study provides many opportunities for future research studies to be
conducted. First, the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype can be used with real data,
where a more robust analysis can be conducted and the technical and psychometric
indicators can be more closely examined. Second, the proof-of-concept prototype is SAS
code based. Future studies can develop other alternatives to perform the data mining
procedures, or create an API that would facilitate the use of the tool. Third, further
research can be done with word content filtering and artificial intelligence for the use of
word context and sentence structure. While an attempt was made to take HTTP visit
content and email content into consideration as an insider threat risk factor, many issues
arose causing an extreme level of false positives, resulting in key word identification and
content filtering being dropped as a risk factor. Forth, while the Big Five trait model has
been widely used in IS research, other studies suggest that it does not completely account
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for individual differences in personality and human behavior specifically traits around
anti-social behavior and the Dark Triad personality traits (Withers, Parrish, Terrell, &
Ellis, 2017). Future research can dive deeper into socially averse personality types and
their relationship to deviant computer use.

Summary
The research problem addressed by this study is the imminent challenge to
mitigating cybersecurity insider threats from employees or contractors who may bring
harm to the organization by misusing information systems, computer networks, or data
(Sood et al., 2015). Insider threat attacks are more in number and more costly than
external attacks (Ambre & Shekokar, 2015, p. 436). Information security is not just about
the implementation of specific technologies to monitor information systems, but also the
people and processes that rely on these systems (Bowen et al., 2011). Organizations are
sitting on repositories of security relevant data that is not being fully capitalized upon by
security practitioners with current information security policies and tools (Early & Stott
III, 2015). This study facilitated an increase in the body of knowledge by providing
validated indicators and a method to connect and correlate the indicators; in a manner that
can shift organizational practices from reactive to proactive security by providing
organizations a set of indicators to begin to focus their monitoring efforts. This study
addressed a valid problem with practical significance (Terrell, 2015).
The main goal of this research study was to design, develop, and validate a proofof-concept prototype for a malicious cybersecurity insider threat alerting system that will
assist in the detection and prediction of malicious insider threat activity using human-

152
centric technical activities, as well as, individual employee psychometric rating scales.
Building on the works of Agrafiotis, Legg, Goldsmith, and Creese (2014), Costa et al.,
(2014), Greitzer, Dalton, Kangas, Noonan, and Hohimer (2012), Nostro, Ceccarelli,
Bondavalli, and Brancati (2014), Warkentin and Willison (2009), as well as, Greitzer et
al., (2009), this work was classified as developmental research. Furthermore, it answers
the call to develop a proof-of-concept prototype to assist in the detection of malicious
insider threat activity. To achieve the main goal, this research set seven specific goals to
address seven specific research questions, using a three-phased approach.
During Phase 1, an exploratory study was conducted using a group of
cybersecurity SMEs from the LinkedIn professional network to address the following
questions:
RQ1: What are the important cybersecurity indicators validated by the expert
panel that can assist in the detection of insider threat activity?
RQ2: What are the expert-validated cybersecurity indicator categories?
First, this study performed an extensive review of literature to establish a list of
appropriate cybersecurity technical and psychometric indicators. Next, via anonymous
online survey, the Delphi method was used with 46 SMEs to propose and validate a set of
indicators that can assist in the detection of insider threat activity. The result of the survey
identified the top 10 cybersecurity indicators from both the technical and psychometric
indicator categories. These results addressed RQ1. Following, the same anonymous
online survey asked the SMEs to validate cybersecurity indicator categories. Therefore
addressing RQ2.
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In continuing Phase 1, once the SMEs had validated the top 10 cybersecurity
indicators and cybersecurity indicator categories, another anonymous online survey was
administered to same group of SMEs, with 26 SMEs responding, to address the following
research questions:
RQ3: What are the expert-approved weights for the identified cybersecurity
indicators?
RQ4: What are the expert-identified most significant correlations between
cybersecurity indicators?
The SMEs were presented their top 10 identified cybersecurity indicators and asked to
weight the indicators, as to assign order of importance. The cybersecurity indicator
weights provided by the SMEs were averaged and accepted as weights for the indicators.
The indicator with the highest weight represented employees logging on after hours more
than 30% of the time, while the indicator with the lowest weight represented employees
receiving emails from an external source, where the body of the email contained a risky
word more than 30% of the time. Therefore, addressing RQ3. Similarly, the same
anonymous online survey asked to choose the most significant correlations between
cybersecurity indicators. The top 10 most frequently identified pairings were retained as
significant correlations. Pairings with frequencies less than three were excluded. These
results addressed RQ4.
Phase 2 of this research study consisted of the operationalization of the
cybersecurity indicators using SAS analytics software, as well as, performing a preanalysis screening of the dataset. Once the cybersecurity indicators were operationalized,
analysis of the dataset was performed to identify each simulated user’s activity in relation
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to the operationalized indicators. Lastly, once the simulated users activity had been
identified, a flat file was create to perform the statistical analysis. Phase 2, of this study
asked following research questions:
RQ5a: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to
have a high rate of false positives as measured by the AI-InCyThR
prototype?
RQ5b: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to
have a high rate of false negatives as measured by the AI-InCyThR
prototype?
RQ6: What simulated user activity indicators were identified by the AI-InCyThR
proof-of-concept prototype as significant indicators to identify insider
threat activity?
To address research questions 5a, cross tabulations were performed for both the
system identified indicators and the SME identified indicators. For the system identified
indicators, EM9 had the highest percentage of false positives with 82.29%. For the
SME’s identified indicators, EM7 had the highest percentage of false positives with
64.01%. Therefore, addressing RQ5a.
In addressing research question 5b, the majority of system identified indicators
had a high rate of false negatives, ranging from 71.77% to 100%. Out of the 10 SMEs
identified indicators, LG2 had the lowest false negative rate of 15.32%. EM6, and EM5,
had the highest false negative rate with 99.19%. It was observed that the rest of the SMEs
identified indicators had a high rate of false negatives, ranging from 52.42% to 98.39%.
Therefore, addressing RQ5b.
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In addressing research question 6, a series of bivariate binary logistic regressions
were performed on both the system identified indicators and the SMEs identified
indicators to determine the indictors that were significant predictors of malicious users.
For the system selected indicators, the bivariate models exhibited EM9 was a significant
predictor of being a malicious user, OR = 0.01, p < .001. The odds of being a malicious
user are 0.01 times lower for users who perform this activity when compared to users
who do not perform this activity. The bivariate models also exhibited HT7 was a
significant predictor of being a malicious user, OR = 0.19, p = .001. The odds of being a
malicious user were 0.19 times lower for users who performed this activity when
compared to those who do not perform this activity. Additionally, the models exhibited
no other significant predictors of malicious users. For the SMEs identified indicators, all
the indicators were significantly predictive of increased likelihood of being a malicious
user, except for LG1, HT6, and PS2A. Additionally, only LG2 and LG3 had a significant
positive relationship to malicious use, whereas, MC1, EM8, EM7, EM6, EM5, had a
significant negative relationship with malicious use. The results of HT6 showed greatly
inflated estimates and should be treated with caution. In regard to HT6, data analysis
proved that only 3 users performed this activity. This seemed questionable and the
analysis was run a second time which provided the same result. Therefore, addressing
RQ6.
In Phase 3, the SME identified indicators were compared towards their actual
significance and OR as reported by bivariate logistic regression to address RQ7.
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RQ7: How are the simulated user activity correlations that were identified by the
SMEs different than those identified by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as
significant to identify insider threat activity?
The result indicated that only LG3 and LG2 validated the SMEs high rating of
importance as evident by high odds ratios. This in comparison to the SMEs high rating,
and low odd ratios for the other indicators, indicating that the directionality of the
relationship as generated by the AI-InCyThR system is opposite of what the SMEs rated.
Therefore, addressing RQ7.
This study made several contributions to Information Systems and Information
Security body of knowledge by developing a SME validated set of cybersecurity
indicators and an effective method for the detection of anomalous activities when
mitigating malicious cybersecurity insider threats. Specifically, indicators LG3 and LG2,
exhibited being strong predictors of malicious activity, and were consistent with the
SMEs rating of strong importance. Of the other system identified indicators, they were
either not statistically significant (MC4, MF4, EM2, PS1B, PS3B, PS4B, PS5B, LG1, &
PS2A) or significant in the negative direction (EM9, HT7, MC1, EM8, EM7, EM6, &
EM5), meaning that employees without the indicators were more likely to be a malicious
users, than employees with the indicators (contrary to original expectation).
Additionally, the study resulted in establishing validated weights for the
cybersecurity indicators. Moreover, the study provided empirical evidence regarding
cybersecurity indicators and indicator categories important in cybersecurity monitoring
and response decision-making, and the mitigation of malicious cybersecurity insider
threat. Given the complexity of the insider threat phenomenon, the results presented in
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this study will provide organizations with empirical evidence that can be leveraged to
improve the organizations cybersecurity posture, in an effort to lower the probability of
financial, information, and intellectual property losses.
In conclusion, organizations can use the validated cybersecurity indicators of
LG3, LG2, to assist in the detection of malicious cybersecurity insider threat activity. AIInCyThR proof-of-concept prototype addressed the challenge of detecting complex
malicious cybersecurity insider threats activity in an unconventional manner by
validating indicators and indicator correlations. Additionally, organizations can the AIInCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as a model for addressing the issues faced when
fine tuning cybersecurity monitoring tools and solutions to identify malicious
cybersecurity insider threat activity.
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Appendix B
Expert Recruitment Email
Dear Cybersecurity Expert,
We seek your help in providing expert validation for an upcoming doctoral research
study. I am a PhD candidate in Information Systems, focused on Cybersecurity, at the
College of Engineering and Computing, Nova Southeastern University. My research
study seeks to develop a proof-of-concept prototype tool that will determine technical and
psychometric indicators as precursors to a malicious cybersecurity insider threat attack.
These indicators include email activity, http activity, file access, and psychometric
classification. To develop the proof-of-concept prototype tool, I need assistance from
experts who have knowledge in cybersecurity for three phases of data collection. Phase 1
of my research requires assistance from experts to validate and assign weights to
technical and psychosocial indicators that may be used by tools such as Security Event
and Information Management (SIEM) systems or Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).
An online survey will be used to determine the content of the Phase 1 indicator catalogue.
All participants are subject matter experts in this area.
By participating in this study, you agree and understand that your responses are
voluntary. Measures will be taken to ensure that responses are anonymous and cannot be
traced to any individual. You may stop participating in the study at any time. In the event
that you no longer wish to participate in the study, your responses will not be recorded.
By participating in this study, you certify that you are over the age of 18 years. If you are
willing to participate, please click on the link below for access and completion by
[DATE]: [LINK]
Thank you in advance for your consideration. I appreciate your assistance and
contribution to this research study.
If you wish to receive the findings of the study, please contact me via email and I will
provide you with the information about the academic research publication(s) resulting
from this study.
Regards,
Angel Hueca, PhD Candidate
E-mail: ah1676@nova.edu
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